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INTRODUCTION 
This year, the fiftieth anniversary of the passage of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, is also the twenty-fifth anniversary of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.1 Hopkins reaffirmed what the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), lower courts, and the 
Supreme Court itself had long observed about Title VII’s prohibition on dis-
crimination in employment on the grounds of sex: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding em-
ployers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and wom-
en resulting from sex stereotypes.”2 
In honoring both these anniversaries through this Essay, I will be reaffirm-
ing arguments I first made about the implications of the Hopkins decision in my 
1995 Yale Law Journal article Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence.3 
 
 1. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned Hopkins’s treatment of mixed-motives 
claims, it did not affect the portion of that decision relevant to my discussion here.  
 2. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water 
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). Although this language comes from 
the plurality opinion, the disagreement of those concurring was neither on the sex-
stereotyping theory of liability nor on the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather on the bur-
den of proof. See id. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 261-62 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 3. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995). The 
issues and cases dealt with in that article, and especially in this Essay, have captured the im-
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Some of these arguments have finally been accepted by both federal courts and 
the EEOC, but others, although once long ago accepted, have more recently, 
unfortunately, been called into question. My analysis of the implications of 
Hopkins focused on the appropriate legal treatment of the various forms of 
what I called gender discrimination, defined as “discrimination in favor of or 
against qualities coded masculine or feminine, sometimes irrespective of and 
sometimes inflected by whether the person exhibiting those qualities was male 
or female.”4 Famously, the prevailing plaintiff in the case, Ann Hopkins, had 
been criticized by those considering her for partnership in an accounting firm 
for being “macho,” “overly aggressive,” and “tough-talking,” and had been ad-
vised that her chances for partnership would improve were she to “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled, . . . wear jewelry,” and go to “charm school.”5 Because to ask 
these things of her when they were not required of a male candidate was held to 
be impermissible discrimination on the grounds of sex, I drew from the case a 
roadmap for protection against discrimination in employment for gender bend-
ers of all sorts, including those whom lower courts had earlier refused to pro-
tect, such as plaintiffs who were denied employment or suffered harassment on 
the job because they were perceived as effeminate, gay, or transgender, or in 
violation of sex-specific codes of dress, grooming, or behavior. I thought at the 
time that women who moved in a direction perceived as masculine were the 
most readily assured of legal protection—after all, Ann Hopkins had won her 
case, the Supreme Court was about to order women admitted to the hyper-
masculine Virginia Military Institute (VMI),6 and California had even passed 
legislation that made it a violation of state sex discrimination laws for an em-
ployer to prohibit female employees from wearing pants to work.7 The more 
difficult task, to which I devoted the bulk of my article, would, I thought, be in 
persuading courts and other decisionmakers that the logic of Hopkins equally 
protected a male employee’s moves in the direction of a more feminine gender 
presentation. 
For some time after Hopkins, and contrary to its clear holding, courts in Ti-
tle VII cases continued to enforce sex-specific employment codes against and 
left vulnerable to firing and harassment both male-to-female (MTF) transsexu-
 
agination of the legal academy and generated hundreds of articles by others. To cite and en-
gage with even the most relevant among them would consume the space allotted to me here. 
With apologies to the authors of the many fine works that deserve mention, I shall therefore 
only cite to works when I am relying specifically on them for a proposition.  
 4. Mary Anne Case, No Male or Female, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 83, 84 (Martha Albertson Fineman 
ed., 2011). 
 5. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 7. Act of Sept. 12, 1994, ch. 535, § 2, 1994 Cal. Stat. 2760, 2761 (codified as amend-
ed at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12947.5(a) (West 2014)). 
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als and male plaintiffs who did not claim to be transgender, but who neverthe-
less engaged in behavior seen as stereotypically feminine.8 Since the turn of the 
millennium (and particularly in the last several years), however, transsexuals, 
effeminate men, and gay men have found increasing favor with the EEOC and 
with courts adjudicating Title VII anti-sex-stereotyping cases, as I shall discuss. 
On the other hand, in the infamous Jespersen case, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, 
enforced a sex-specific grooming code against a female plaintiff who did not 
identify as transgender, but simply claimed that her employer’s requirement 
that she wear makeup “‘prohibited [her] from doing [her] job’ because ‘[i]t af-
fected [her] self-dignity . . . [and] took away [her] credibility as an individual 
and as a person.’”9 Jespersen’s employer, Harrah’s Casino, ironically gave the 
name “Personal Best” to the sex-specific grooming regime under which it re-
quired Jespersen and all other female bartenders to wear color-coordinated 
foundation, rouge, mascara, and lipstick while it forbade all male bartenders 
from wearing any makeup at all. For the violation of this “Personal Best” 
grooming code, Jespersen, who found wearing makeup was an obstacle to per-
forming at her own personal best, was fired.10 
One of my aims in this Essay is to examine ways in which employment 
discrimination law can best facilitate what would indeed be each employee’s 
personal best, regardless of sex, gender, or orientation. Among the potential 
vehicles currently before Congress is the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA), which would explicitly offer employees some protection from dis-
crimination on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation (includ-
ing homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality, but unfortunately not 
asexuality)11 and gender identity.12 I shall set out two sets of concerns about 
the current version of ENDA. The first includes normative concerns that a turn 
toward ENDA and away from Title VII could privilege those gender benders 
who can and do claim an identity as transgender or gay, but could increasingly 
leave out those who cannot or do not choose to claim such an identity, includ-
ing those whose transgression of conventional gender norms is less extreme, 
consistent, or unidirectional. Such a result would be a step backward for the 
freedom of gender expression and from sex stereotyping for all individuals, be-
traying the promise of Title VII and making it harder for many employees to 
give their actual personal best. It is therefore imperative, I shall argue, that pro-
gress under Title VII and the increasingly robust line of sex-stereotyping cases 
 
 8. Case, supra note 3, at 64-66. 
 9. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (alterations in original). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(10) 
(2013) (as referred to the House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 2013). 
 12. Id. § 3(a)(7).  
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that are the progeny of Hopkins be vigorously pursued whatever the fate of 
ENDA in Congress.  
I will also, however, argue as a descriptive and predictive matter that even 
those single-mindedly focused on protecting employment opportunities for les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees should have concerns 
about the limitations on LGBT rights that the provisions of the current version 
of ENDA might lock into law. Among these are an extremely broad religious 
exemption,13 concession to sex-specific grooming standards,14 the absence of a 
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), preclusion of disparate impact 
claims15 and affirmative action,16 an extremely broad but potentially confusing 
definition of gender identity,17 and an absence of explicit protections for many 
items of concern to the transgender community, including use of pronouns and 
bathrooms consistent with an individual’s gender identity. 
Given, on the one hand, the recent favorable progress in the direction of 
protection against employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
and gender identity in the courts and the EEOC under Title VII (as well as in 
states and localities under local antidiscrimination laws), and, on the other 
hand, the severe limitations imposed on such protections by the current text of 
ENDA, perhaps the most important provision in ENDA is section 15, which 
provides that ENDA shall not “invalidate or limit the rights, remedies, or pro-
cedures available to an individual claiming discrimination prohibited under any 
other Federal law or regulation or any law or regulation of a State or political 
subdivision of a State.”18 
Were the current version of ENDA to pass, I fervently hope both advocates 
and judges take seriously this provision, so that, while they pick up the new 
tools ENDA offers them, they do not let the recently sharpened tools of Title 
VII become dull or rusty. I am encouraged in this hope by the EEOC’s inclu-
sion as a “national priorit[y]” of its Strategic Enforcement Plan for 2013-2016 
“the emerging and developing issue” of “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions.”19 
 
 13. Id. § 6. 
 14. See id. § 8(a). 
 15. Id. § 4(g). 
 16. Id. § 4(f). 
 17. See id. § 3(a)(7). 
 18. Id. § 15. 
 19. EEOC, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013-2016, at 8-10 (2013) (capitaliza-
tion altered), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf. 
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I. TITLE VII AND THE LEGACY OF HOPKINS 
A. The Text and Legislative History of Title VII Are Sharp Tools to Strike 
at the Entire Spectrum of Disparate Treatment of Men and Women 
Resulting from Sex Stereotypes 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was initially intended principally 
to combat discrimination in employment on the grounds of race. The near last-
minute addition of “sex” to the forbidden grounds of race, color, national 
origin, and religion in Title VII may, however, have had an even greater trans-
formative effect on American law and life than anything else in the Act. Once 
an initially reluctant EEOC finally took seriously the complaints of sex dis-
crimination with which it was inundated from the start and promulgated regula-
tions prohibiting employers from relying on either stereotyped characterizations 
of the sexes, coworker or customer preferences, or restrictive state laws as ex-
cuses to deny women employment opportunities,20 whole categories of work 
that had de jure been closed to women opened up. Men, too, were clearly bene-
fited in multiple ways: they became newly eligible for job categories once cate-
gorically closed to them,21 and the EEOC required that employers, who had 
hitherto provided benefits such as premium pay for overtime or special rest and 
meal breaks only to female employees in compliance with state law, extend 
such benefits to male workers unless demonstrably precluded by business ne-
cessity.22  
Moreover, as I have previously demonstrated, the development of the law 
of sex discrimination under Title VII led in path-dependent ways to the current 
U.S. constitutional law of sex equality.23 First, many of the important early Su-
preme Court cases, from negative precedents like Bradwell v. State24 and 
Goesaert v. Cleary25 to Ruth Bader Ginsburg victories like Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson,26 involved the terms and conditions for women’s employment. Second, 
language that opposed limiting the opportunities of the sexes on the basis of 
stereotypes migrated from the EEOC guidelines on the BFOQ27 to state and 
 
 20. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2013). 
 21. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(striking down a per se exclusion of males from the job of flight attendant). 
 22. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(3). 
 23. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional 
Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000). 
 24. 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding the exclusion of women from the practice 
of law). 
 25. 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding the exclusion of women not supervised by 
male relatives from tending bar). 
 26. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (striking down the disparity in spousal benefits provided 
to males and females employed by the armed forces). 
 27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2. 
 June 2014] LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR EACH EMPLOYEE 1339 
lower federal court cases on public employment that combined constitutional 
and statutory claims28 and to the Supreme Court, first in the Title VII case of 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.29 and then in the constitutional case of 
Frontiero.30 Finally, it was in a case about access to vocational training for 
men seeking to be employed as nurses that Justice O’Connor made clear that 
our constitutional rule for equal protection on grounds of sex is that state action 
must be “free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and 
females.”31  
Similar sentiments to Justice O’Connor’s—it may surprise some readers to 
learn—were also central to those members of Congress who supported the ad-
dition of “sex” as a forbidden ground in Title VII. Courts and commentators 
from all sides of the political spectrum have resolutely insisted for fifty years 
that there is no useful legislative history attached to the introduction of sex as a 
forbidden ground in Title VII because, according to these commentators, sex 
was added at the last minute by the racist Southern chair of the House Rules 
Committee, Howard Smith of Virginia, in part as a joke and in part as a devious 
attempt to bring the whole Civil Rights Act down to defeat.32 Anyone who con-
tinues to hold and promulgate this view has unaccountably not bothered to read 
even the Congressional Record of the proceedings in question, let alone the 
many works by scholars who have filled in the relevant background. As I and 
others have often written,33 Representative Smith was indeed a racist and 
would have been happy to see the defeat of the Civil Rights Act, but he had al-
so been a sponsor of the Equal Rights Amendment since 1943 and was a sup-
porter of the National Woman’s Party (NWP).34 More importantly, the moder-
ate Republican and Democratic women in the House who rose in support of his 
addition of the word “sex” were by no means joking or ambivalent in their sup-
port.  
What both the racist Southern congressmen and the moderate Northern 
congresswomen who supported the inclusion of sex as a forbidden ground 
shared was an awareness of and a commitment to what we today call 
intersectionality. Representative Smith’s racism interacted in important ways 
 
 28. See, e.g., Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 540 (Cal. 1971) (en banc). 
 29. 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 30. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
 31. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982). 
 32. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-84 (1991) (“[S]ex discrimination in private employment was forbid-
den under federal law only in a last minute joking ‘us boys’ attempt to defeat Title VII’s 
prohibition on racial discrimination. Sex was added as a prohibited ground of discrimination 
when this attempted reductio ad absurdum failed and the law passed anyway.”).  
 33. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 765, 767-70 (2002). 
 34. See JO FREEMAN, WE WILL BE HEARD: WOMEN’S STRUGGLES FOR POLITICAL 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 171-90 (2008). 
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with his support for women’s rights. He understood quite well that, as Michi-
gan Democratic Representative Martha Griffiths—also connected to the 
NWP—put it in floor debate, “a vote against this amendment today by a white 
man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his sister.”35 As 
Representative Smith and other conservative, white Southerners saw it, unless 
Congress included prohibitions on sex discrimination with those on grounds of 
race, color, religion, and national origin, “the white woman of mostly Anglo-
Saxon or Christian heritage [would be deprived of] equal opportunity before 
the employer”36 compared not only to Anglo-Saxon Christian men, but also to 
men and women of every other race, ethnicity, and religion. Representative 
Smith may have been a racist, but he did not want “his” women to take second 
place to men and women of other races. For Representative Griffiths, black 
women were also an important intersectional category; she stressed that black 
women needed a prohibition on sex discrimination were they to have any hope 
of equal employment opportunity and illustrated her point with examples from 
every class of employment—from a Negro female dishwasher seeking to move 
from “a ‘greasy spoon’” to a “very good restaurant which employed on-
ly . . . white men” to “a colored woman political scientist” seeking a job at a 
university where there “has never been a woman political scientist em-
ployed.”37 
Thus, if one were to look to the legislative history of the inclusion of sex as 
a forbidden ground, one would find ample evidence of a legislative attempt to 
be comprehensive, to make sure that discrimination on the basis of one identity 
category could not be used by an employer to cover up or justify discrimination 
on the basis of another, and to ensure that no category of person who might 
face employment discrimination would be excluded from the protections of Ti-
tle VII. As Representative Edna Kelly insisted: 
My support and sponsorship of this amendment and of this bill is an endeavor 
to have all persons, men and women, possess the same rights and same oppor-
tunities. . . .  
 . . . . 
 I do not want anyone to be denied that which is his or her inherent rights as 
an individual.  
 Let us recognize that there are many minorities in this country in all 
groups and organizations. . . . For their opportunity, we seek to secure these 
rights under this bill . . . .38 
While LGBT and other gender-nonconforming persons may not have been 
among the minorities within groups foremost on the Title VII legislators’ 
minds, one can certainly find more evidence in the legislative history in support 
 
 35. 110 CONG. REC. 2580 (1964) (statement of Rep. Martha Griffiths). 
 36. Id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. L. Mendel Rivers). 
 37. See id. at 2579 (statement of Rep. Martha Griffiths). 
 38. Id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Edna Kelly). 
 June 2014] LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR EACH EMPLOYEE 1341 
of extending to these sexual minorities equal employment opportunity under 
the rubric of the prohibition on sex discrimination than evidence against so do-
ing.39  
 According to Representative Katharine St. George, “[t]he addition of that 
little, terrifying word ‘s-e-x’ will not hurt this legislation in any way. In fact, it 
will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it logical. It will 
make it right.”40 Representative St. George’s observation has import as more 
than legislative history, because for some powerful interpreters of statutory 
language, such as Justice Scalia, “the use of legislative history is illegitimate 
and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that 
is clear on its face.”41 And a principal advantage of Title VII has been the clari-
ty and simplicity of its legislative language. It took very little more than the ad-
dition of the single word “sex” to a statute already clear in its prohibition of 
discrimination to effect revolutionary change. 
While early judicial interpreters used the alleged absence of legislative his-
tory to justify diverging from the clear text in ways harmful to the rights of 
gender benders, it is important to note that one of the Supreme Court decisions 
most important to this Essay’s claims, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.,42 was decided unanimously in favor of the plaintiff, with Justice Scalia 
writing for the Court. To the charge that “male-on-male sexual harassment in 
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil with which Congress was 
concerned when it enacted Title VII,”43 Justice Scalia responded that  
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII pro-
hibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” 
of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend 
to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.44 
 
 39. Representative Emanuel Celler’s remarks during floor debate are suggestive. Rep-
resentative Celler opposed both the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII and the passage of the 
Equal Rights Amendment because “[t]he list of foreseeable consequences . . . is unlimited.” 
Id. at 2578 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler). “Imagine the upheaval that would result 
from adoption of blanket language requiring total equality,” he warned the House. Id. at 
2577. After listing what were for him a parade of horribles, including equal rights of men 
and women to child custody, alimony, and working conditions (each of which has indeed 
come to pass), he concluded, in a self-described moment of “levity,” by quoting two lines of 
verse: “Lives there a man with hide so tough/Who says, ‘Two sexes are not enough.’” Id. at 
2578. On this score as well, he seems to have been prescient. 
 40. Id. at 2581 (statement of Rep. Katharine St. George). 
 41. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 42. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
 43. Id. at 79. 
 44. Id. at 79-80 (alterations in original). 
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This demonstrated willingness on the part of conservative textualists like 
Justice Scalia to apply the plain, thin language of Title VII—rather than seek to 
restrict it by reference to legislative history—makes it likely that the Supreme 
Court would, if confronted with the issue, ratify the increasing trend of the 
lower courts to protect sexual minorities under the text of Title VII and the log-
ic of Hopkins, even in the absence of ENDA. As I will suggest below, however, 
it may bode less well for the Supreme Court’s potential reception of the much 
wordier, convoluted, and confusing text of ENDA.  
B. The Path to Protection of Transgender, Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Employees Under Title VII  
Justice Scalia’s Oncale opinion may have been a catalyst in finally pushing 
courts to reexamine their precedent on the coverage under Title VII of sexual 
minorities and gender-nonconforming employees in light of Hopkins. In the 
early years after the passage of Title VII, a few decisions by influential courts 
considered and rejected the proposition that discrimination on the basis of ho-
mosexuality or against transsexual employees was discrimination on the basis 
of sex.45 Other courts reflexively cited these precedents for decades without 
ever reexamining them. A hallmark of these decisions is that they claimed to be 
relying on the statutory text while they blatantly disregarded its actual lan-
guage. In the leading case of Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., for example, the 
Seventh Circuit justified its “den[ial of Title VII] protection for transsexuals” 
by reference to what it characterized as plain statutory text and a “dearth of leg-
islative history”: 
The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its plain 
meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because 
they are women and against men because they are men. . . . The dearth of leg-
islative history . . . strongly reinforces the view that that section means nothing 
more than its plain language implies.46  
Several things are of note about the court’s moves here. First, only the 
word “sex,” not any reference to either “men” or “women,” appears in the text 
of Title VII. In the European Union (EU), by contrast, the comparable statutory 
language speaks explicitly of having as its “purpose . . . to put into effect in the 
Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
 
 45. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); see also, e.g., 
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979); Holloway v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977). As I shall discuss further below, it is note-
worthy that the Ninth Circuit, allegedly left leaning and quite frequently reversed by the Su-
preme Court, has written so many of the central and influential bad precedents in the areas 
covered by this Essay.  
 46. 742 F.2d at 1085. 
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access to employment.”47 Nevertheless, when first presented with the question 
in the mid-1990s, the European Court of Justice had no trouble holding that the 
statutory language “cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the 
fact that a person is of one sex or the other sex” but also “appl[ies] to discrimi-
nation arising . . . from the gender reassignment of the person concerned” such 
that the law “precludes dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gen-
der reassignment.”48 
Second, in insisting that the “the phrase in the Civil Rights Act prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sex should be given a narrow, traditional inter-
pretation,” the appeals court in Ulane was responding to and rejecting efforts—
including those of the district court which had ruled in Ulane’s favor—to read 
into the statutory language a “broad interpretation of the term” sex, encompass-
ing “sexual identity.”49 Instead of using the terms “broad” and “narrow” to de-
scribe the two competing visions of the meaning of the term “sex” in Title VII 
with which the Ulane courts were wrestling, I prefer to use the terms “thick” 
and “thin.” A thick definition of sex might include in the concept not only a le-
gal designation as male or female, but also, for example, sexual identity, sexual 
orientation, gender expression, and gender identity. There have, over the years, 
been many who have advocated for such a thick definition,50 precisely in hopes 
of thereby bringing under the protection of the prohibition against discrimina-
tion in employment a broader array of persons, including but not limited to the 
“homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals” discussed in Ulane,51 as well as 
offering protection to a broader range of what the current draft of ENDA refers 
to as the “gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-
related characteristics of an individual.”52 
My own longstanding and unshaken view, driven at least as much by prac-
tical lawyering considerations as by ideological commitments, is that a thin def-
inition of sex in law is not only more normatively attractive but is, in general, a 
more effective way to achieve legal protection for the broadest possible range 
of sexual identities, gendered traits, and the individuals manifesting them. This 
thin view reduces legal sex—in the sense of legal designation as male or fe-
 
 47. Council Directive 76/207, art. 1, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40) 1 (EC). The Directive was 
promulgated to implement article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, in which each member state 
committed to “ensur[ing] and subsequently maintain[ing] the application of the principle that 
men and women should receive equal pay for equal work.” Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community art. 119, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
 48. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall Cnty. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-2159, I-2165 to 
-2166.  
 49. 742 F.2d at 1084, 1086. 
 50. See generally, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimina-
tion Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995).  
 51. 742 F.2d at 1085. 
 52. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(7) 
(2013) (as referred to the House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 2013). 
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male—to little more than the potential basis for a claim of discrimination, al-
lowing a plaintiff, whether in a statutory or a constitutional case, to prevail by 
showing that the plaintiff’s legal sex is causally related to the treatment of 
which the plaintiff complains (i.e., that the detrimental treatment occurred, to 
use the words of Title VII, “because of such individual’s . . . sex”).53 The des-
ignation of a plaintiff’s sex in a Title VII suit merely serves as the grounding 
for the plaintiff’s claims against the employer: “If my sex were other than the 
one you have attributed to me, I would not be in the position I’m in. You 
wouldn’t be refusing to hire me or promote me; you wouldn’t be harassing me; 
you wouldn’t be requiring me to dress this way.” This thin, stripped down view 
of legal sex may not feel true to an individual’s full and rich sense of sexual 
and gender identity. Indeed, validating the identity of LGBT employees seems 
to be one important reason many in the LGBT community and their allies sup-
port the passage of ENDA, quite apart from any concrete legal results it may 
achieve for them or any cases whose outcome it might change. But the thin 
view of sex under Title VII, like a thin view of sex in U.S. constitutional law, 
opens the possibility of legal protection to gender benders of all stripes, re-
gardless of their sex; regardless of whether they can or do make an identitarian 
claim as transgendered . . . or . . . gay; and regardless of how mild or how ex-
treme, how occasional or how systematic, their transgression of conventional 
gender norms may be.54 
This thin view of sex, interpreting the words of Title VII to mean that an 
employee’s sex “must be irrelevant to employment decisions,”55 underlies the 
Hopkins decision, which therefore stands ready to be mobilized both by those 
who claim a particular sexual identity and those who do not, as well as by those 
who have one attributed to them by those who discriminate against them in 
employment and those who do not. Consider, for example, the principal plain-
tiff in Doe v. City of Belleville, among the earlier cases to use Hopkins on be-
half of a victim of harassment on the job.56 Apparently in large part because he 
wore an earring to his summer job, Doe, a heterosexual male high school stu-
dent, was subject to harassment, including being called names (from “girl” and 
“bitch” to “queer” and “fag”) and having his testicles grabbed by a coworker in 
order to “finally find out if [he was] a girl or a guy.”57 Judge Ilana Rovner saw 
the case as directly parallel to Hopkins, because in each case the negative 
treatment on the job was taken in “reliance upon stereotypical notions about 
 
 53. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 54. Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1205-06 (2010). 
 55. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1988) (plurality opinion), super-
seded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
 56. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
 57. Id. at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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how men and women should appear,” and this “gender stereotyping establishes 
the link to the plaintiff’s sex that Title VII requires.”58 
Some of the earliest cases to recognize the implications of Hopkins for 
claims of sex discrimination by transgender plaintiffs were not Title VII cases. 
At the turn of the millennium, in Schwenk v. Hartford, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld a claim by a transgender prisoner under the Gender Motivated 
Violence Act, holding that “[t]he initial judicial approach taken in cases such as 
[Ulane] has been overruled by the logic and language of” Hopkins, in which the 
Supreme Court made clear that discrimination based on the failure “to conform 
to socially-constructed gender expectations” and “[d]iscrimination because one 
fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman [are] forbidden under Title 
VII.”59  
Within five years of Schwenk, the Sixth Circuit relied on Hopkins in decid-
ing a pair of cases brought by preoperative MTFs, each of whom was in the sort 
of conventionally masculine job that had typically been categorically off-limits 
to women as a matter of law in the days before Title VII. After having been di-
agnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), Jimmie Smith, a firefighter, had 
begun “expressing a more feminine appearance” at work, leading coworkers to 
“comment[] that his appearance and mannerisms were not ‘masculine 
enough.’”60 Upon being told of Smith’s diagnosis and “the likelihood that his 
treatment would eventually include complete physical transformation from 
male to female,”61 Smith’s superiors conspired to use his “transsexualism and 
its manifestations as a basis for terminating his employment.”62 Smith’s case 
for unlawful sex discrimination was simplified by his ability and willingness to 
plead “that he is a male with Gender Identity Disorder.”63 The appeals court 
could therefore simply hold:  
 After [Hopkins], an employer who discriminates against women because, 
for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimi-
nation because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex. It 
follows that employers who discriminate against men because they do wear 
dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex dis-
crimination, because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s 
sex.64 
 The Sixth Circuit went on to fault the district court for failing to apply 
Hopkins because it had erroneously sought to “superimpose classifications such 
 
 58. Id. at 581. 
 59. 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 60. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir.) (internal quotation mark 
omitted), superseding 369 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 570. 
 64. Id. at 574. 
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as ‘transsexual’ on [the] plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination based on 
the plaintiff’s gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-conformity into 
an ostensibly unprotected classification.”65 
A year later, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Smith that “[s]ex 
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermis-
sible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as 
‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has 
suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”66 This 
time, the plaintiff was another preoperative MTF, but a police officer, who—
after decades on the force, during which time he had developed “a reputa-
tion . . . as a homosexual, bisexual or cross-dresser”67—failed his probationary 
period for promotion to sergeant due to an alleged lack of “command presence” 
after having been warned “that he needed to stop wearing makeup and act more 
masculine.”68 
Three other successful transsexual plaintiffs in subsequent years are worth 
mentioning here, because each of their cases added a further important element 
to the development of the law. The first, retired Special Forces Colonel 
Schroer, had been offered a job as a Specialist in Terrorism and International 
Crime with the Congressional Research Service, only to have the offer rescind-
ed when the hiring supervisor learned the Colonel would be showing up for 
work not as David, but as Diane.69 Although there was evidence that Schroer’s 
“especially masculine” Special Forces background “made it all the more diffi-
cult for [the hiring supervisor] to visualize Diane Schroer as anyone other than 
a man in a dress”70 and also that the supervisor worried that Schroer would lose 
credibility in Congress (before whom she was hired to testify) because “people 
would perceive [Schroer] to be a woman, and would refuse to believe that she 
could possibly have the credentials that she had,”71 Judge James Robertson ini-
tially rejected Schroer’s Hopkins-based sex-stereotyping claim, because he 
could not reconcile it with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Jespersen that a gen-
erally applicable employer policy that “imposed equally burdensome, although 
gender-differentiated, standards on men and women” did not constitute dispar-
ate treatment on grounds of sex—and therefore did not violate Title VII.72 Hav-
ing been persuaded that the policy applied to Schroer was not in fact “a gener-
ally applicable, gender-specific policy, requiring proof that the policy itself 
 
 65. Id.  
 66. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smith, 
378 F.3d at 575). 
 67. Id. at 733. 
 68. Id. at 735 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295-99 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 70. Id. at 305.  
 71. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 72. Id. at 304.  
 June 2014] LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR EACH EMPLOYEE 1347 
imposed unequal burdens on men and women,” but an application of stereo-
types directly to Schroer as an individual, “render[ing] proof of disparate treat-
ment unnecessary,”73 Judge Robertson concluded: 
 Ultimately, I do not think that it matters for purposes of Title VII liability 
whether the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived 
Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine 
woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual. . . . Schroer is en-
titled to judgment based on a [Hopkins]-type claim for sex stereotyping . . . .74 
Judge Robertson’s move here to distinguish the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Jespersen instead of, as I argue he should have done, simply rejecting it as in-
correct because of its inconsistency with both the plain language of Title VII 
and the Supreme Court’s holding in Hopkins, works a noteworthy and troubling 
reversal in the path of the law. Schroer’s exceptional status as a transsexual, ra-
ther than excluding her from protection against sex discrimination—as it risked 
doing for prior transsexual plaintiffs—actually cut in her favor according to 
Judge Robertson, giving her a claim against sex-respecting appearance re-
quirements not seen as available to the mine run of women such as Jespersen. 
As I shall discuss below, whichever way it cuts, a division drawn between the 
legal rights of plaintiffs challenging sex-respecting appearance standards—
making losers of some on the basis of their gender identity—should be seen to 
violate existing antidiscrimination law and does tremendous damage, not only 
to the individuals involved, but also to the prospects for progress toward a soci-
ety and a workforce enriched by the “personal best” of everyone. 
In addition to finding in Schroer’s favor on a sex-stereotyping theory, 
Judge Robertson held that discrimination against her as a transsexual was itself 
sufficient to ground her claim because “the Library’s refusal to hire Schroer af-
ter being advised that she planned to change her anatomical sex by undergoing 
sex reassignment surgery was literally discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”75 
Just as an employer who was willing to hire both Christians and Jews but re-
fused to hire converts from one religion to the other would present “a clear case 
of discrimination ‘because of religion,’”76 Judge Robertson held, “in cases 
where the plaintiff has changed her sex, and faces discrimination because of the 
decision to stop presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman,”77 the 
discrimination is a clear violation of the plain language of Title VII. 
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit extended the holding that “discrimination 
against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex 
discrimination” beyond Title VII to a constitutional case brought by a transsex-
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 305.  
 75. Id. at 308 (alteration in original).  
 76. Id. at 306. 
 77. Id. at 306-07. 
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ual employee of the Georgia General Assembly, Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn.78 
Finally, in 2012, the EEOC itself issued a decision in favor of Mia Macy, a 
transgender woman whose progress toward a government job abruptly ended 
when the hiring supervisor learned “that [Macy] was in the process of transi-
tioning from male to female.”79 After reviewing lower court precedents, as well 
as the Hopkins and Oncale decisions and the “plain language of the statute,” the 
EEOC “conclude[d] that intentional discrimination against a transgender indi-
vidual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination 
‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”80  
The defendant federal employer in Macy had one system for adjudicating 
claims of sex discrimination under Title VII and a separate system, offering dif-
ferent and lesser rights, for adjudicating complaints of sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination against its employees.81 Macy had alleged “sex 
stereotyping, sex discrimination based gender transition/change of sex, and sex 
discrimination based gender identity” as the forbidden grounds on which her 
job offer had been rescinded, but the agency had divided her claim and stated 
that it would proceed under Title VII only with the sex/female claim and would 
proceed under its other process for the gender identity claim.82 The EEOC held 
that this was error and that it had jurisdiction under Title VII over the entire 
claim because “[e]ach of the formulations of Complainant’s claims are simply 
different ways of stating the same claim of discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ a 
claim cognizable under Title VII”83: 
 Thus, a transgender person who has experienced discrimination based on 
his or her gender identity may establish a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion through any number of different formulations. These different formula-
tions are not, however, different claims of discrimination that can be separated 
out and investigated within different systems. Rather, they are simply different 
ways of describing sex discrimination.  
 For example, Complainant could establish a case of sex discrimination un-
der a theory of gender stereotyping by showing that she did not get the job . . . 
because the employer believed that biological men should consistently present 
as men and wear male clothing.  
 Alternatively, if Complainant can prove . . . that the Director was willing to 
hire her when he thought she was a man, but was not willing to hire her once 
 
 78. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 79. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (Apr. 
20, 2012). 
 80. Id. at *11 (second alteration in original). 
 81. Id. at *5.  
 82. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Id. at *5 (second alteration in original); see Mary Anne Case, All the World’s the 
Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655 (2007); cf. DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 
434, 440 (7th Cir. 2000) (Rovner, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he lines with which we attempt 
to divide the various categories of discrimination cannot be rigid.”). 
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he found out that she was now a woman—she will have proven that the Direc-
tor discriminated on the basis of sex. Under this theory, there would actually 
be no need . . . to compile any evidence that the Director was engaging in gen-
der stereotyping.84 
 The EEOC endorsed and expanded on the Schroer court’s analogy to dis-
crimination against religious converts, noting that in the case of discrimination 
against converts from one religion to another: 
There would be no need for the employee who experienced the adverse em-
ployment action to demonstrate that the employer acted on the basis of some 
religious stereotype . . . . [T]he employee simply must demonstrate that the 
employer impermissibly used religion in making its employment decision. 
 . . . . 
 Applying Title VII in this manner does not create a new “class” of people 
covered under Title VII—for example, the “class” of [religious con-
verts] . . . . Rather, it would simply be the result of applying the plain language 
of a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion to practical situ-
ations in which such characteristics are unlawfully taken into account.85 
C. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII: Moving from 
“Loopholes” and “Bootstraps” to Full Coverage 
I began Disaggregating Gender by observing that in the case law up to that 
point, “When individuals diverge from the gender expectations for their sex—
when a woman displays masculine characteristics or a man feminine ones—
discrimination against her is now treated as sex discrimination while his behav-
ior is generally viewed as a marker for homosexual orientation and may not re-
ceive protection from discrimination.”86 
Francisco Valdes, who, also in 1995, wrote a lengthy comprehensive arti-
cle analyzing this problem, referred to it as “a sexual orientation loophole” 
which “enable[s] defendants and decisionmakers to (re)characterize, at will, a 
plaintiff’s sex and gender discrimination claim as involving only permissible 
sexual orientation discrimination,” thereby ratifying sex and gender discrimina-
tion.87 
Courts were slow to close this loophole after the Hopkins decision.88 In a 
number of cases around the turn of the millennium in which the plaintiff 
 
 84. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *10. 
 85. Id. at *11.  
 86. Case, supra note 3, at 2. 
 87. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Con-
flation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 18 (1995). 
 88. For an early case denying the claim that Hopkins was relevant to a claim of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment by an effeminate gay man, see Dillon v. Frank, 952 
F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Case, supra note 3, at 57-61 (discussing Dillon). 
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acknowledged that his homosexuality played some role in his adverse treatment 
but also raised a sex-stereotyping or other sex discrimination claim, appellate 
courts avoided the issue by finding that the claim of sex discrimination or the 
invocation of Hopkins and sex stereotyping was raised too late or was inade-
quately developed.89 There were indications that at least some of these courts 
would be particularly receptive to future sex-stereotyping claims by effeminate 
men, gay or not, given that a claim based on this “failure to conform to gender 
norms . . . . would not bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII 
because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not all heter-
osexual men are stereotypically masculine.”90 The good news here was that the 
language in these appellate decisions left open the possibility that a timelier or 
better-pleaded claim could fare better. Among the lower court judges taking up 
this possibility in subsequent better-pleaded cases was Judge Nancy Gertner in 
Massachusetts. Faced with postal worker Stephen Centola’s claim that “his co-
workers continuously tormented him . . . mocking his masculinity, portraying 
him as effeminate, and implying that he was a homosexual,”91 Judge Gertner 
noted: 
[T]he line between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimi-
nation because of sex is hardly clear. Sex stereotyping is central to all discrim-
ination: Discrimination involves generalizing from the characteristics of a 
group to those of an individual, making assumptions about an individual be-
cause of that person’s gender, assumptions that may or may not be true. . . . 
Stated in a gender neutral way, the rule is: If an employer acts upon stereo-
types about sexual roles in making employment decisions . . . then the em-
ployer opens itself up to liability under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex. 
 . . . . 
 Centola does not need to allege that he suffered discrimination on the basis 
of his sex alone or that sexual orientation played no part in his treatment. . . .  
 . . . Sexual orientation harassment is often, if not always, motivated by a 
desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms. In fact, stereotypes 
about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the proper 
roles of men and women. While one paradigmatic form of stereotyping occurs 
when co-workers single out an effeminate man for scorn . . . the issue is far 
more complex. The harasser may discriminate against an openly gay co-
worker, or [one] he perceives to be gay, whether effeminate or not, because he 
thinks, “real men don’t date men.” The gender stereotype at work here is that 
“real” men should date women . . . . Conceivably, a plaintiff who is perceived 
by his harassers as stereotypically masculine in every way except for his actu-
al or perceived sexual orientation could maintain a Title VII cause of action al-
 
 89. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37-38 (2d Cir.), amending 225 F.3d 
122 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 90. Id. at 38. 
 91. Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (D. Mass. 2002). 
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leging sexual harassment because of his sex due to his failure to conform with 
sexual stereotypes about what “real” men do or don’t do.92 
Judge Gertner’s analysis here suggests one route—through sex stereotyp-
ing—by which all discrimination against an employee because of his homosex-
uality could receive Title VII protection as discrimination on the basis of sex. 
As with transsexuality, another route would be to proceed under the plain lan-
guage of Title VII to the realization that, given that a homosexual person’s sex 
is necessarily taken into account rather than treated as irrelevant in reaching the 
determination to discriminate against him, such discrimination is necessarily 
“because of” sex. Still a third route, rejected in the 1970s by the Ninth Circuit 
in the leading case of DeSantis,93 would be through analogy to established 
precedent holding that it is actionable discrimination under Title VII to discrim-
inate against an employee because of the race of those with whom (s)he associ-
ated.94 Because there was ample evidence before Judge Gertner that Centola’s 
perceived effeminacy was at the root of his discriminatory harassment, she did 
not have to “go so far”95 as her analysis suggested that the logic of the law 
would lead in order to rule in Centola’s favor. 
The Ninth Circuit, which had also ruled in DeSantis that discrimination on 
grounds of effeminacy was not protected under Title VII, was prepared to re-
visit at least that part of its holding in light of Hopkins. One of the component 
cases of DeSantis, Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc., involved a 
male nursery school teacher fired simply for his “effeminate appearance.”96 
Faced in 2001 with the claim of Antonio Sanchez, a gay male waiter who was 
“mocked . . . for walking and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman,’ and 
taunted . . . as, among other things, a ‘faggot’ and a ‘fucking female whore,’” a 
panel of the Ninth Circuit agreed that “the holding in [Hopkins] applies with 
equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too feminine” and 
“to the extent it conflicts with [Hopkins] . . . DeSantis is no longer good law.”97 
Perhaps because Strailey’s alleged effeminacy was manifested simply by his 
wearing an earring, the panel opinion then dropped a footnote of gratuitous dic-
ta: “We do not imply that all gender-based distinctions are actionable under Ti-
 
 92. Id. at 408-10 (footnote omitted). For a similar analysis involving a lesbian plain-
tiff, see Heller v. Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D. Or. 2002).  
 93. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 94. Id.; see also Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 246-58 (2012). 
 95. Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 410.  
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tle VII. For example, our decision does not imply that there is any violation of 
Title VII occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female 
employees to conform to different dress and grooming standards.”98 
As subsequent Parts of this Essay will discuss, this footnote—from which 
there is a direct line to the Ninth Circuit’s en banc holding in Jespersen—can 
be seen as the thin end of the wedge through which, as courts relying on Hop-
kins became more receptive to claims by sexual minorities (including, especial-
ly, effeminate men, gay men, and transgender plaintiffs), they paradoxically 
became less receptive to plaintiffs who more closely resembled Ann Hopkins 
herself—women who asserted no identity as a sexual minority, but whose gen-
der presentation veered slightly more in a masculine direction than suited their 
employers. 
The Ninth Circuit itself demonstrates this incipient divide. Four years be-
fore it ruled en banc against Jespersen, it decided (also en banc) in favor of 
Medina Rene, “an openly gay man” who alleged that he was subject to harass-
ment including not only verbal taunts but also “offensive physical conduct of a 
sexual nature.”99 A plurality of the court, in an opinion by Judge William 
Fletcher—one of the Jespersen dissenters—held that the mere fact that Rene 
was singled out to be “grabbed in the crotch and poked in the anus” and that 
this “offensive conduct was sexual”100 sufficed to ground a cause of action, and 
Rene’s “sexual orientation . . . was simply irrelevant.”101 The plurality made no 
mention of sex stereotyping. A concurrence by Judge Harry Pregerson, who 
wrote a dissent in Jespersen, by contrast, stressed that the “repeated testimony 
that his co-workers treated Rene, in a variety of ways, ‘like a woman’ consti-
tutes ample evidence of gender stereotyping.”102 Chief Judge Mary Schroeder, 
author of the en banc majority opinion in Jespersen, joined a dissent which 
found that, unlike Sanchez, Rene had “made no claim of sexual stereotyp-
ing”103 and shown no evidence of effeminacy, but was harassed simply “be-
cause of his sexual orientation, which is not actionable under Title VII.”104 
There is some reason for optimism that Title VII protections against sex 
discrimination will increasingly be extended beyond effeminate gay men to 
those gay and lesbian plaintiffs whose only deviation from sex stereotypes is in 
their choice of a partner of the same sex. As with transgender plaintiffs, so with 
 
 98. Id. at 875 n.7. 
 99. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
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103. Id. at 1077 (Hug, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 1078. 
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gay and lesbian plaintiffs, the EEOC is increasingly putting the weight of its 
powers to investigate and adjudicate claims behind the proposition that such 
plaintiffs have viable sex discrimination claims under Title VII. In two recent 
cases, for example, the EEOC reversed the dismissal of complaints brought by 
postal workers—one a gay man, the other a lesbian—holding that each had 
stated a potentially viable claim of impermissible sex stereotyping.  
Jason Veretto alleged that a coworker threatened him when he learned of 
Veretto’s impending wedding to another man and that supervisors had failed to 
take appropriate action.105 Holding that these “allegations are sufficient to state 
a viable hostile work environment claim under Title VII,”106 the EEOC noted 
that Veretto “has essentially argued that [the coworker] was motivated by the 
sexual stereotype that marrying a woman is an essential part of being a 
man, . . . . [i]n other words . . . that [his] actions were motivated by his attitudes 
about stereotypical gender roles in marriage.”107 
Similarly, the EEOC held that lesbian Cecile Castello had made out “a 
plausible sex stereotyping case . . . under Title VII”108 when she alleged her 
supervisor “made an offensive . . . comment about her having relationships 
with women. . . . motivated by the sexual stereotype that having relationships 
with men is an essential part of being a woman . . . .”109 
Most recently, Peter Terveer alleged that his supervisor at the Library of 
Congress “intentionally discriminated against [him] because his identity as a 
homosexual male represents a departure from sex stereotypes recognized by 
[his supervisor].”110 The district court held that Terveer had adequately pleaded 
a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII even though his complaint enu-
merated only his sexual orientation and no other aspects of his “behavior, de-
meanor or appearance” as the trigger for the discrimination against him.111 
What sets these latter claims apart from earlier successful hostile work en-
vironment claims by gay plaintiffs relying on sex stereotyping, such as Sanchez 
and Centola, is that no mention is made of any effeminate traits on the part of 
Veretto or Terveer or of masculine traits on the part of Castello, nor was har-
assment directed in a sexualized way at their body parts, as it was against Rene. 
Only their choice of a same-sex partner (or their homosexual orientation more 
 
105. Veretto v. Donahoe, EEOC Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *1 
(July 1, 2011). 
106. Id. at *3. 
107. Id. 
108. Castello v. Donahoe, EEOC Appeal No. 0120111795, 2011 WL 6960810, at *2 
(Dec. 20, 2011). 
109. Id. at *2-3. 
110. Terveer v. Billington, No. 12-1290 (CKK), 2014 WL 1280301, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 
31, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111. Id. at *9. Terveer alleged that he is “a homosexual male whose sexual orientation 
is not consistent with the Defendant’s perception of acceptable gender roles.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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generally) grounds their sex discrimination claims. The logical consequence of 
accepting such claims would be categorically to overturn the mistaken view 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not sex discrimination 
and therefore not remediable under Title VII. It seems particularly fitting that 
the road to such a realization is coming through the consideration of the claims 
of public employees, since among the earliest cases protecting gay men and 
lesbians from losing their jobs because of their sexual orientation were cases 
relying on statutory protections for civil servants.112  
D. Enforcement of Sex-Specific Dress and Grooming Codes by Lower 
Courts Violates both the Plain Language of Title VII and the Clear 
Holding of Hopkins 
Although the progress of claims brought by transgender and gay plaintiffs 
under Title VII has shown a positive trend, moving from early disregard of the 
plain language of the statute to increasing willingness to take seriously both the 
statutory language and the lessons of Hopkins, a trend in the opposite direction 
has emerged in cases challenging sex-specific grooming codes brought by 
plaintiffs who did not identify as transgender. Early on, the EEOC was ready to 
hold unlawful an employer’s imposition of disparate grooming standards on the 
sexes. In cases from 1972, for example, the EEOC ruled succinctly as follows: 
Employer allows its female employees to wear their hair longer than male em-
ployees. To maintain one employment standard for females and another for 
males discriminates because of sex . . . and is unlawful unless the employer 
demonstrates the applicability of the narrow [BFOQ] exception . . . . [which 
w]e hold, . . . as a matter of law, . . . is not applicable to . . . Employer’s long 
hair policy.113 
Some early court decisions were in line with this approach. Although he ul-
timately found that the plaintiffs before him were fired for reasons unrelated to 
their employer’s grooming policy, Judge Warren Ferguson wrote eloquently of 
the connection between sex-neutral grooming policies and the deep purpose of 
Title VII: 
An employer has every right to adopt dress codes suitable to various job cate-
gories. . . . A dress . . . code, however, must be applied equally to everyone. It 
may not establish different standards for males and females; it may not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. 
 
112. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that, because 
“the efficiency of the service” was not implicated, a civil servant could not be fired even 
though he conceded to having engaged in homosexual activity and had been accused of mak-
ing a homosexual advance on an undercover Morals Squad officer (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
113. EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 846 (1972) (citation 
omitted).  
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 The issue of long hair on men tends to arouse the passions of many in our 
society today. In that regard the issue is no different from the issues of race, 
color, religion, national origin and equal employment rights for women, all of 
which are raised in Title VII. When this Nation was settled it was hoped that 
there be established a society where every individual would be judged accord-
ing to his ability . . . . The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was born of that hope. 
Although the legal technicalities are many, the message of the Act is clear: 
every person is to be treated as an individual, with respect and dignity. Stereo-
types based upon race, color, religion, sex or national origin are to be avoided. 
 . . . . 
 Males with long hair conjure up exactly the sort of stereotyped responses 
Congress intended to be discarded. . . . Title VII does not permit the employer 
to indulge in such generalizations. The Act requires that every individual be 
judged according to his own conduct and job performance.114 
Unfortunately, in the period before Hopkins, courts moved away from the 
plain language of the statute and tended to endorse employer dress and groom-
ing codes that differed by sex. Even the EEOC admitted defeat, declaring that, 
although it held to its longstanding view that “absent a showing of a business 
necessity, different grooming standards for men and women constitute sex dis-
crimination under Title VII,”115 because “the circuit courts of appeals have 
unanimously concluded that different appearance standards for male and fe-
male employees, particularly those involving hair length where women are al-
lowed to wear long hair but men are not, do not constitute sex discrimination” 
it would “administratively close all sex discrimination charges which dealt with 
male hair length.”116 The EEOC initially declared that this “policy applied only 
to male hair length cases and was not intended to apply to other dress or ap-
pearance related cases”117 and continued to insist that, “where a dress policy 
reflects a stereotypical attitude toward one of the sexes, that policy will be 
found in violation of Title VII.”118 Yet, unfortunately, by 1981, the EEOC 
Compliance Manual included among examples of dress codes that might be 
permissible under Title VII—“if suitable and . . . equally enforced and so long 
as the requirements are equivalent for men and women with respect to the 
standard or burden that they impose”—an employer’s “requir[ing] male em-
ployees to wear neckties at all times and female employees to wear skirts or 
dresses at all times.”119 
Among the justifications commonly propounded by courts upholding sex-
differentiated dress and grooming codes were that the elements of personal ap-
pearance involved in a typical grooming code were neither immutable nor fun-
 
114. Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
115. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 619.1 (Oct. 1981). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. § 619.4(b). 
119. Id. § 619.4(d). 
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damental rights; that complying with grooming codes would be a de minimis 
burden on an employee; and that policing grooming codes would be an unwar-
ranted judicial intrusion into an employer’s business decisions. But the trial 
court in the leading case of Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. 
was perfectly candid about what was at stake: 
[I]f it be mandated that men must be allowed to wear shoulder length hair . . . 
because the employer allows women to wear hair that length, then it must log-
ically follow that men, if they choose, could not be prevented by the employer 
from wearing dresses to work if the employer permitted women to wear dress-
es. . . . [I]t would not be at all illogical to include lipstick . . . and other items 
of typical female attire among the items which an employer would be power-
less to restrict to female attire . . . . It would be patently ridiculous to presume 
that Congress ever intended such result . . . .120  
As I observed in 1995, the specter of the man in a dress has haunted all 
discussion of the abolition of sex-specific grooming codes.121 According to the 
EEOC, the “vast majority of cases treating employer grooming codes as an is-
sue have involved appearance requirements for men.”122 But the clear holding 
of Hopkins should have ended any questioning of the EEOC’s quite correct 
holding in 1972 that, unless it can be justified as a BFOQ, any dress or groom-
ing code that sets different requirements for males than for females violates Ti-
tle VII.123 The Supreme Court did “not find as a matter of fact that [Hopkins’s] 
appearance was appropriate for her sex; it [held] as a matter of law that it con-
stitutes sex discrimination for her employer to require that it be so.”124 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit, one of the few appellate courts to revis-
it the question of an employer policy requiring short hair only from male em-
ployees after the Hopkins decision, declared in 1998 that “[n]o decision cited 
by the plaintiffs has supplanted the reasoning or called into question the con-
clusions set forth in” longstanding, binding precedent holding that “such a poli-
cy was not discriminatory.”125 Astonishingly, there is no mention whatsoever 
of Hopkins in the court’s opinion, leaving the reader to wonder whether the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer had committed malpractice or whether the court was being 
 
120. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972), 
rev’d, 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
121. See Case, supra note 3, at 7. 
122. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 619.1 (Oct. 1981). 
123. See EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 846 (1972). 
124. Case, supra note 3, at 61. The record before the Court gave no clue what Hopkins 
actually looked like or how she dressed. 
125. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998); see al-
so Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding, similarly 
without any mention of Hopkins, that recent Supreme Court cases had not undercut prior 
lower court precedents upholding differential hair length requirements for male and female 
employees). 
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disingenuous in distinguishing only a series of cases much less obviously rele-
vant.  
Thus, notwithstanding what I continue to view as a clear holding interpret-
ing a clear statutory text prohibiting employer-mandated distinctions between 
the sexes, my expectation that Hopkins would spell the end of legally enforcea-
ble employer-mandated, sex-specific appearance codes was wildly overoptimis-
tic. That the dress codes would have some staying power I was prepared for— 
after all, as Wendy Williams shrewdly observed with respect to the Supreme 
Court’s departures from a principled application of the anti-stereotyping re-
quirement in constitutional sex equality cases, courts very rarely “come right 
out and say ‘We’ve reached our cultural limits,’” but when they do reach those 
limits they have a track record of “refus[ing to] proceed further with gender 
equality.”126 What did surprise me was where the biggest sticking point 
came—not, as I would have predicted, with respect to a man who wished to 
dress more femininely, but rather with respect to a woman who was instructed 
by her employer to wear makeup, just like Ann Hopkins, and was fired for re-
fusing. 
If any case would seem to be on all fours with the case of Ann Hopkins, it 
is that of Darlene Jespersen. Both were women in traditionally male fields127 
with a track record of outstanding performance128 and customer satisfaction.129 
Each was told that to satisfy the demands of higher management in her organi-
zation, she would have to acquire a more feminine appearance, including in 
each case to “‘wear make-up, [and] have her hair styled.’”130 Like Hopkins, 
Jespersen could claim that her employer’s demand put her in “an intolerable 
and impermissible catch 22,”131 because a certain level of assertiveness incom-
patible with the feminized appearance her employer now required was neces-
sary to do the job effectively. Jespersen testified that being forced to be femi-
nine and “wear makeup” actually interfered with her ability to be an effective 
bartender (which sometimes required her to deal with unruly, intoxicated 
guests) because it “took away [her] credibility as an individual and as a per-
 
126. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, 
Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 158-59 (1992).  
127. Jespersen was not a cocktail server or a “bevertainer,” service categories dominat-
ed by women and emphasizing sexiness, but one of very few women then tending bar in the 
casino. See generally Ann C. McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 795, 805 (2013). 
128. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc). 
129. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989) (plurality opinion), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as 
recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
130. Id. at 235; see Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.  
131. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251. 
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son.”132 But Jespersen lost at every level—on summary judgment before the 
district court, on appeal before a panel of the Ninth Circuit, and again before 
the Ninth Circuit en banc.133 
The Ninth Circuit claimed it “took this sex discrimination case en banc in 
order to reaffirm our circuit law concerning appearance and grooming stand-
ards, and to clarify our evolving law of sex stereotyping claims.”134 But, as I 
am far from the first academic commentator to observe, instead of “reaf-
firm[ing] [its] circuit law concerning appearance and grooming standards,”135 
the Ninth Circuit should have reevaluated its approach in light of Hopkins and 
concluded that its own “evolving law of sex stereotyping claims,” previously 
focused on coworker harassment of effeminate men like Sanchez, was even 
more clearly applicable to an employer’s direct discriminatory treatment of a 
woman like Jespersen.  
As with Macy’s claim before the EEOC,136 there were many potential 
routes to victory for Jespersen, but a majority of the Ninth Circuit rejected all 
of them. The Ninth Circuit could have, as Jespersen’s appellate attorney, 
Lambda Legal’s Jenny Pizer, called upon them to do, “enforce[d] the federal 
employment discrimination statute as written,” acknowledging that, “[i]f . . . 
Jespersen were male, she still would be working behind Harrah’s Sports Bar,” 
 
132. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks  
omitted). 
133. Id. at 1105-06. 
134. Id. at 1105. 
135. Id. Just as the Ninth Circuit had been an early leader in ruling against LGBT plain-
tiffs under Title VII, so it had been in the forefront of appellate courts rejecting the sex dis-
crimination claims of employees challenging sex-specific dress and grooming codes. See, 
e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding a necktie 
requirement for males); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974) (up-
holding a short hair requirement for males). In the years after Hopkins, the Ninth Circuit’s 
principal appearance case, Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000), in-
volved weight requirements for flight attendants. In her Jespersen opinion, Chief Judge 
Schroeder described Frank as striking down “a weight policy that applied different standards 
to men and women in a facially unequal way. The women were forced to meet the require-
ments of a medium body frame standard while men were required to meet only the more 
generous requirements of a large body frame standard.” Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109. Chief 
Judge Schroeder had been the author of the majority opinion in Frank’s predecessor, the pre-
Hopkins, en banc decision in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(en banc). Chief Judge Schroeder described Gerdom in Jespersen as holding that it constitut-
ed a Title VII violation for the airline to have “imposed strict weight restrictions on female 
flight attendants . . . . because the airline imposed no weight restriction whatsoever on a class 
of male employees who performed the same or similar functions as the flight attendants.” 
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109. The experience of Chief Judge Schroeder and her colleagues 
with the much more dramatically unequal appearance burdens imposed by the airlines may 
have colored their approach to Jespersen’s claim. 
136. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
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but “‘[b]ecause of [her] sex,’ her employment ended.”137 They could have 
held—as the EEOC had been insisting since the early 1970s and as the Jesper-
sen dissenters would have held—that any sex distinctions in grooming or ap-
pearance needed to be justified as a BFOQ.138 They could have, as the Jesper-
sen dissenters also would have done, followed the lead of the Seventh Circuit in 
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n,139 and found Harrah’s very 
specific makeup requirements for women to be a “facial uniform,” discrimina-
tory given that men were left much more discretion as to their facial appear-
ance.140 Even if they were going to continue to insist, incorrectly, that “unequal 
burdens” remained the correct standard for grooming codes post-Hopkins (and 
even if they were to disregard the psychological burden on Jespersen as an in-
dividual), they could have agreed with dissenting Judge Alex Kozinski, who 
stated: 
Every [Harrah’s] requirement that forces men to spend time or money on their 
appearance has a corresponding requirement that is as, or more, burdensome 
for women: short hair v. “teased, curled, or styled” hair; clean trimmed nails v. 
nail length and color requirements . . . . The requirement that women spend 
time and money applying full facial makeup has no corresponding require-
ment for men, making the “overall policy” more burdensome for the former 
than for the latter. . . .  
 It is true that Jespersen failed to present evidence about what it costs to buy 
makeup and how long it takes to apply it. But is there any doubt that putting 
on makeup costs money and takes time?141 
 
137. Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight Against the 
Barbie-fication of Bartenders, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 290 (2007) (fourth alter-
ation in original) (footnote omitted). As Pizer observed, unlike Hopkins, which was a mixed-
motives case, necessitating evidence of discriminatory intent to determine whether “her job 
performance or her gender performance” was what cost Hopkins a partnership, for Jespersen 
the determinative role played by gender performance requirements, and hence by her sex, in 
her loss of her job was undisputed. Id. at 312. 
138. See 444 F.3d at 1114 n.2 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“Harrah’s has not attempted 
to defend the ‘Personal Best’ makeup requirement as a BFOQ. In fact, . . . Harrah’s quietly 
disposed of this policy after Jespersen filed this suit.”); see also supra note 113 and accom-
panying text. 
139. 604 F.2d 1028, 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that requiring women to wear 
a uniform while leaving male employees free to wear their choice of business attire violates 
Title VII). The Jespersen dissenters saw Carroll as “closely analogous.” See Jespersen, 444 
F.3d at 1116 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
140. Male bartenders at Harrah’s were “free to wear any style of facial hair, or none at 
all.” See Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 6, Jesper-
sen, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-15045), 2003 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 15045. On the other 
hand, as Judge Pregerson’s dissent pointed out, “Harrah’s . . . imposed a facial uniform (full 
makeup) on only female bartenders. . . . Jespersen was required not simply to wear 
makeup; . . . consultants dictated . . . how the makeup had to be applied.” Jespersen, 444 
F.3d at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
141. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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Finally, they could have seen what was clear to the dissenters, “that the 
‘Personal Best’ program was part of a policy motivated by sex stereotyp-
ing.”142 As Judge Kozinski put it most colorfully: 
Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, mascara 
and lipstick while on the bench. Like Jespersen, I would find such a regime 
burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job performance. . . .  
 Everyone accepts this as a reasonable reaction from a man, but why should 
it be different for a woman? It is not because of anatomical differences . . . . 
Women’s faces, just like those of men, can be perfectly presentable without 
makeup . . . . I see no justification for forcing them to conform to Harrah’s 
quaint notion of what a “real woman” looks like.143 
The Ninth Circuit majority did advance the law of the circuit to this ex-
tent—they held that “appearance standards, including makeup requirements, 
may well be the subject of a Title VII claim for sexual stereotyping.”144 Yet 
they went on to find “that on this record Jespersen has failed to create any tria-
ble issue of fact that the challenged policy was part of a policy motivated by 
sex stereotyping.”145 Judge Kozinski’s analysis exposes the unexplained prem-
ise in the majority’s observation that “[g]rooming standards that appropriately 
differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory.”146 The Jes-
persen en banc majority treated the makeup requirement in the same way Jus-
tice Brennan described his colleagues as treating “the Christmas holiday” in an 
Establishment Clause case, as something “so familiar and agreeable” that they 
were blinded to its legally problematic character, and they therefore, like the 
Supreme Court confronted by a government-sponsored nativity display, unjus-
tifiably “depart[ed] from controlling precedent.”147 
 
142. Id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
143. Id. at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. at 1106 (majority opinion). The trial court had thought “the Ninth Circuit had 
excluded grooming standards from the reach of [Hopkins].” Id. The Ninth Circuit panel, re-
lying, like the trial court, on the dicta in footnote seven in Nichols, discussed in Subpart C, 
above, had “held that [Hopkins] could apply to . . . appearance standards only if the policy 
amounted to sexual harassment.” Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1109-10 (emphasis added). 
147. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 696-97 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(saying, of an Establishment Clause challenge to a government-funded Christmas display, “I 
am convinced that this case appears hard not because the principles of decision are obscure, 
but because the Christmas holiday seems so familiar and agreeable”). I have noted that 
blindness to the familiar aspects of sex discrimination is a common problem for courts. See 
Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and 
Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, 402 (describing courts’ reluc-
tance to intervene in the face of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints’s educating girls into an “umbrella of belief” that their duty was to marry and give 
birth at a very young age, being obedient to the husbands chosen for them (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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Let me end this Part of my Essay where I began it, with the position of the 
EEOC. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hopkins conclusively demonstrates 
that the EEOC was quite correct all along that disparate appearance standards 
for males and females violate Title VII unless they can be justified as a BFOQ 
and that, as a matter of law, most cannot be so justified. It is long past the time 
for the EEOC to revise and update both its Compliance Manual and its en-
forcement policies in line with Hopkins. It should remove the pre-Hopkins lan-
guage endorsing equal burdens148 and return unequivocally to its earlier posi-
tion, since ratified by the Supreme Court in Hopkins. Rather than closing 
charges in which employees challenge sex-specific appearance standards, the 
EEOC should actively pursue them. Action by the EEOC in returning to its ear-
lier position regarding appearance codes would have many benefits. Besides 
being true to the statutory text and the holding in Hopkins and assisting em-
ployees like Jespersen, it could advance the EEOC’s stated Strategic Enforce-
ment Plan priority regarding “coverage of [LGBT] individuals under Title VII’s 
sex discrimination provisions”149 given the crucial role sex-specific grooming 
codes have played in employment actions taken against LGBT employees.150 
II. THE UNEVEN PROGRESS OF OPPOSITION TO SEX STEREOTYPING, IN 
LAW AND IN LIFE 
It is illuminating to put Jespersen’s case, like Hopkins’s, in the climate of 
its times and to notice how the times have changed. At the time the Supreme 
Court decided Hopkins, legal as well as sociocultural opposition to sex stereo-
typing was still on the upswing. By the time of the VMI case, in the decade fol-
lowing Hopkins, only Chief Justice Rehnquist in his lone concurrence support-
ed an approach under the Constitution akin to that endorsed by the Ninth 
Circuit majority in Jespersen for Title VII—that sex-differentiated regimes 
were impermissible if they imposed “a requirement that categorically ‘applie[d] 
less favorably to one gender,’” but not necessarily if they imposed “different 
but essentially equal burdens on men and women.”151 Even then, Chief Justice 
 
148. As noted above, the EEOC adopted this language not because it had changed its 
own position, but because it felt it could no longer hold out against the contrary view uni-
formly adopted by the circuit courts of appeals. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying 
text. The Hopkins decision gives the EEOC the legal justification, and indeed the responsi-
bility, not to defer any longer to these erroneous lower court decisions.  
149. See EEOC, supra note 19, at 9-10. 
150. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 
1989) (per curiam) (rejecting a race discrimination claim by a black, gay man reprimanded 
for wearing makeup); Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 
35237, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (describing a transitioning MTF who was fired for what 
the court granting summary judgment to the employer described as “a legitimate non-
discriminatory purpose—breach of the [sex-specific] grooming policy”).  
151. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (alteration in original) (quoting Frank v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000)); cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
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Rehnquist was careful to insist that any differentiation must not rest on sex ste-
reotyping.152 His authorship of the majority opinion in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs may, in retrospect, turn out to have been a high-
water mark for the repudiation of sex stereotypes and resulting differentiated 
regimes for the sexes with respect to employment and constitutional rights.153 
Hibbs put the full force of Congress’s powers under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment behind what Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged was a 
not yet fully successful effort to “protect the right to be free from gender-based 
discrimination in the workplace,” taking aim at “mutually reinforcing stereo-
types [which] created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination.”154  
Between the time Hibbs was decided and the time Jespersen reached the 
Ninth Circuit en banc, the tide may have shifted back toward increasing ac-
ceptance of differentiating in law (and in society) between males and females. 
At the time the Supreme Court mandated its integration, VMI was one of fewer 
than half a dozen sex-segregated public schools nationwide. By 2006, there 
were more than 200.155 In that same year, the Bush Administration promulgat-
ed new guidelines under Title IX which had the potential to allow public 
schools to set up sex-segregated classrooms embodying the very sex stereo-
types both the Constitution and Title VII had repudiated.156  
Ironically, at the same time federal courts, following Hopkins, were begin-
ning to take seriously claims that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion was sex discrimination under Title VII, the Supreme Court of California, in 
direct reliance on prior bad interpretations of Title VII, denied that sexual ori-
entation discrimination was sex discrimination. At the very moment of extend-
 
565-56 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that although the 
“women’s institution Virginia proposes, VMIL, fails as a remedy, because it is distinctly in-
ferior to . . . VMI,” “the remedy should not necessarily require either the admission of wom-
en to VMI or the creation of a VMI clone for women,” and that a women’s institution with a 
very different curriculum, faculty, and physical plant could be a sufficient remedy if it “were 
of the same overall caliber”). Justice Scalia dissented in Virginia, and Justice Thomas 
recused himself from the case. See id. at 518 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
For discussion of the analogies between Jespersen and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s ap-
proach in Virginia, see Case, supra note 54, at 1221-23. 
152. See Virginia, 518 U.S at 565-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[T]he State should avoid assuming demand based on stereotypes; it must not assume a pri-
ori, without evidence, that there would be no interest in a women’s school of civil engineer-
ing, or in a men’s school of nursing.”). 
153. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
154. Id. at 728, 736. Hibbs, which concerned the application of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act to the states, focused on “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family 
duties.” Id. at 730. 
155. Diana Jean Schemo, Federal Rules Back Single-Sex Public Education, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/25/education/25gender.html. 
156. See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, The Bush Administration’s Push for Single-Sex Edu-
cation: An Attempt to Erode Federal Gender Equality Guarantees?, FINDLAW (June 11, 
2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20020611.html. 
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ing rights to same-sex couples, the Supreme Court of California endorsed the 
view that “statutes, policies, or public or private actions that treat the genders 
equally but that accord differential treatment . . . to a person based upon wheth-
er he or she generally is sexually attracted to persons of the same gender rather 
than the opposite gender, do not constitute instances of sex discrimination.”157 
Thus, instead of advancing synergistically,158 claims to be free of discrimina-
tion and stereotyping on grounds of sex and of sexual orientation were placed 
in a potentially destructive new tension with one another. 
 A high-water mark for societal opposition to sex-stereotyped grooming 
and appearance standards may have come even earlier, with the trend, at least 
with respect to clothing for boys and girls, shifting in the very year Hopkins it-
self was decided.159 An expert on historical trends in children’s clothing, Jo 
Paoletti, observed: 
Between 1965 and 1985, boys sported long hair and wore boldly patterned 
shirts and pants; girls wore pants, even for school . . . . For a while, it appeared 
that gendered clothing was a thing of the past and that children were, in the 
words of a popular song, “Free to Be You and Me.” But as swiftly as it had 
appeared, the unisex trend faded. Neutral styles for infants were reduced to a 
very small part of the market in the mid-1980s, and by the mid-1990s styles 
for toddlers and young children were more gender specific than they had been 
in the 1950s.160 
Paoletti’s observation—that pendulum shifts in the gendering of children’s 
clothing over the past century can be accounted for by each generation of par-
ents rebelling against the clothes their parents imposed on them and choosing 
otherwise for their children—may mean that when the generation that grew up 
in frilly pink princess dresses or rugged superhero gear begins dressing their 
own offspring, sex-stereotyped appearance standards will once again decline. 
But, in the meantime, a greater societal receptivity to sex stereotyping of chil-
dren’s appearance combined with a greater legal receptivity to identitarian 
claims made on behalf of LGBT individuals has led to a worrying trend in cas-
es involving school children’s dress and appearance norms which, by analogy, 
 
157. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 438 (Cal. 2008) (“In reaching this conclusion, 
[in prior case law] we relied . . . on the circumstance that the identical statutory prohibition 
against sex discrimination in employment set forth in title VII of the 1964 federal Civil 
Rights Act uniformly had been interpreted as not encompassing discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation . . . .”). 
158. For an account of both the possibilities of synergy and the risks in rejecting it, see 
generally Case, supra note 54.  
159. The pendulum for adult women’s dress and grooming standards swung in a some-
what different rhythm. As a litigation associate for Paul, Weiss in the years surrounding the 
Hopkins decision, I never once observed any female lawyer wear a pantsuit. Yet a senior fe-
male partner confessed to a closet full of pantsuits from the 1970s, when wearing them was 
considered more appropriate, as it is once again. 
160. JO B. PAOLETTI, PINK AND BLUE: TELLING THE BOYS FROM THE GIRLS IN AMERICA 
100 (2012).  
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may help illustrate both some of the problems with the evolving law of gender 
nonconformity under Title VII and some of the risks posed by a potential move 
from Title VII to ENDA in adjudicating claims of discrimination on the 
grounds of gender nonconformity. 
The post-millennial trend in school dress code cases suggests that students 
objecting to sex-specific appearance rules seem to have a far clearer road to 
victory if they claim an identity as transgender, gay, or lesbian rather than 
simply raising an objection to being stereotyped on grounds of sex. Thus, alt-
hough Constance McMillin testified that “she wants to wear a tuxedo to the 
prom so that she can express to her school community that ‘it’s perfectly okay 
for a woman to wear a tuxedo, and that the school shouldn’t be allowed to 
make girls wear a dress if that’s not what they are comfortable in,’” the district 
court seemed to find her sexual orientation relevant to a ruling in her favor, not 
only as to her choice of a prom date, but as to her choice of attire—“[t]he rec-
ord shows Constance has been openly gay since eighth grade and she intended 
to communicate a message by wearing a tuxedo and to express her identity 
through attending prom with a same-sex date.”161 And when Pat Doe, a “bio-
logically male” fifteen-year-old, sought to wear “girls’ make-up, shirts, and 
fashion accessories to school,” the Massachusetts judge who ruled in Doe’s fa-
vor stressed that a diagnosis of gender identity disorder meant “that it was med-
ically and clinically necessary for plaintiff to wear clothing consistent with the 
female gender,” and Doe was “expressing her gender identity and, thus, her 
quintessence, at school.”162 Although the actual order issued by Judge Linda 
Giles “preliminarily enjoined [the school] from preventing plaintiff from wear-
ing any clothing or accessories that any other male or female student could 
wear to school without being disciplined”163—and her opinion quoted Brown v. 
Board of Education to the effect that “in the field of public education the doc-
trine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place”—the judge distinguished, rather than 
rejected, earlier cases in which sex-specific dress codes were upheld against 
challenges by plaintiffs who made no identitarian claims.164  
Doe v. Yunits is often paired in discussion with the nearly contemporane-
ous case of Nikki Youngblood, who is in some respects the high school equiva-
lent of Darlene Jespersen. When having her yearbook photo taken, Youngblood 
objected to wearing the “velvet-like, ruffly, scoop neck drape” girls were re-
quired to wear and asked instead to pose in “a white shirt, tie, and dark jacket,” 
 
161. McMillen v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702, 705 (N.D. 
Miss. 2010). 
162. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1, *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 
11, 2000). 
163. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
164. Id. at *7 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see id. at *6. 
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as was required of boys.165 Her request was refused, her photo excluded from 
the yearbook, and she brought suit on the claim that her school had “created a 
discriminatory dress code policy . . . based on stereotypes of how they believe 
males and females should dress.”166 Youngblood’s complaint described her as 
someone who had long rejected “gender stereotypes,” had not worn skirts since 
second grade, and would find it “emotionally damaging” to be forced to wear 
“stereotypically feminine attire,” but the only identity she claimed was “fe-
male.”167 After briefing heavily featuring Title VII cases168 in which the school 
made an “equal burdens” defense, the district court dismissed Youngblood’s 
complaint.169 In the course of an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the case set-
tled, with an agreement providing that in the future “[s]tudents may request an 
exception to the dress code from the principal, who will grant the exception 
when good cause is shown.”170 No specification, however, was made of what 
shall constitute “good cause.” It is unsurprising, therefore, that a subsequent 
challenge to identical yearbook photo requirements in another Florida school 
noted the plaintiff was a lesbian and included a sexual orientation nondiscrimi-
nation provision in the resulting settlement. 
Several things are noteworthy about these yearbook settlements, especially 
when considered in light of Jespersen. First, the settlements did not categorical-
ly strike down sex-specific grooming rules, but only allowed specific excep-
tions for objecting individuals with good cause. This was a settlement Jespersen 
herself was offered but declined to take, in part because she did not see herself 
as exceptional in objecting to the makeup requirement, only in her willingness 
to sue, and she did not want to be “singled . . . out in a problematic way” from 
her female coworkers.171 Second, Youngblood was prepared, indeed eager, to 
cross over entirely from the dress code for females to that for males. Jespersen 
seems never to have been offered this choice, but there is reason to think she 
might have accepted it, given that the only portion of Harrah’s dress code re-
quirement for males she was not in compliance with at the time she lost her job 
was hair length, and her hair, once short, had likely been grown out precisely to 
 
165. Complaint for Damages & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Youngblood v.  




168. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants McCarthy & Fyfe’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Request for Oral Argument, & Memorandum of Law at 5-6, Youngblood, No. 8:02-CV-
1089-T-24MAP (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2002), ECF No. 16. Youngblood’s attorneys also 
stressed the constitutional prohibition on sex stereotyping. See id. 
169. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss & Memorandum of Law, Youngblood, No. 
8:02-CV-1089-T-24MAP (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2002), ECF No. 13; Order, Youngblood, No. 
8:02-CV-1089-T-24MAP (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2002), ECF No. 23. 
170. Settlement Agreement & General Release at 1, Youngblood v. Hillsborough Cnty. 
Sch. Bd., No. 02-15924-CC (11th Cir. Apr. 26, 2004). 
171. Pizer, supra note 137, at 312 n.113.  
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comply to the extent possible for her with Harrah’s requirements for females. 
Third, the difference between the male and female yearbook garb was stark and 
categorical, whereas, as Chief Judge Schroeder stressed in her opinion, Har-
rah’s “‘Personal Best’ . . . . program contained certain appearance standards 
that applied equally to both sexes, including a standard uniform of black pants, 
white shirt, black vest, and black bow tie.”172 
III. THE PROSPECT OF ENDA 
A. Would the Current Version of ENDA Help Darlene Jespersen? 
Hundreds of articles have examined the extent to which Title VII protects 
LGBT individuals and other gender benders from discrimination. Quite a few 
have proclaimed the need for a statute like ENDA to assure such protection. 
Very few, however, have analyzed in any degree of detail what effect the cur-
rent version of ENDA might have on any common fact pattern or concrete case, 
including those already litigated and lost, to establish how, if at all, the result 
would be different and better under ENDA than under Title VII as its interpre-
tation is currently evolving.173 A full examination of the effects of ENDA if 
passed in its current form is far beyond the scope of this Essay as well, but I do 
want to consider ENDA’s possible effects on one concrete case—that of Jes-
persen—because the result illustrates well some of the difficulties with both 
ENDA’s current form and Title VII’s current application by the lower courts. 
The current version of ENDA defines “gender identity” as “the gender-
related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteris-
tics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s designated sex 
at birth.”174 This definition, in striving to be as broad as possible, also risks be-
ing obscure and subject to judicial manipulation or confusion. It is not, for ex-
ample, clear from the text whether ENDA is to be read as prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of individual gender-related characteristics or only those 
which can be seen as part of a recognizable, coherent “gender identity.” Are 
gender-related characteristics intended to be viewed only as what, in earlier 
work, I referred to as “a package deal,”175 or can they give rise to a viable 
 
172. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
173. That little has been written about the potential application of ENDA is not surpris-
ing—ENDA has been hard to enact and has undergone many changes, such that any exami-
nation by either its supporters or its opponents may be premature or may have unintended 
adverse effects on both its text and its chances for passage. 
174. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(7) 
(2013) (as referred to the House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
175. Mary Anne Case, Unpacking Package Deals: Separate Spheres Are Not the An-
swer, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1305, 1311-13, 1320 (1998).  
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cause of action in isolation? Consider, for example, a job applicant discriminat-
ed against because of a high-pitched voice, which is certainly a gender-related 
characteristic.176 Should it matter under ENDA whether this high-pitched voice 
is part of an otherwise feminine gender presentation?177 
If the “appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics” 
are to be taken as a whole, does it matter whether that whole is a combination 
of masculine and feminine gendered characteristics idiosyncratic to the indi-
vidual in question? This question is placed in stark relief when considered in 
light of one of the most troubling provisions in the current version of ENDA: 
Dress or Grooming Standards.—Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an employ-
er from requiring an employee, during the employee’s hours at work, to ad-
here to reasonable dress or grooming standards not prohibited by other provi-
sions of Federal, State, or local law, provided that the employer permits any 
employee who has undergone gender transition prior to the time of employ-
ment, and any employee who has notified the employer that the employee has 
undergone or is undergoing gender transition after the time of employment, to 
adhere to the same dress or grooming standards as apply for the gender to 
which the employee has transitioned or is transitioning.178 
Although the first half of this provision is carefully framed to leave open 
the possibility that there are not (or at least that at some future time179 there 
may not be) any sex-specific dress or grooming standards “not prohibited by 
other provisions of” law, the reference in the second half to such standards “as 
apply for the gender to which the employee has transitioned or is transitioning” 
mitigates against the possibility that what is meant by “reasonable dress or 
grooming standards” is simply and exclusively sex-neutral standards of busi-
ness attire appropriate for the job in question. 
Only a minority of state prohibitions on gender identity discrimination ex-
plicitly mention dress codes, and their language is much less inclined to rein-
force a gender binary either on dress codes or the employees subject to them 
than is the current version of ENDA. California’s provision, typical of those of 
a number of states, allows “an employer to require an employee to adhere to 
reasonable workplace appearance, grooming, and dress standards not precluded 
by other provisions of state or federal law, provided that an employer shall al-
low an employee to appear or dress consistently with the employee’s gender 
identity or gender expression.”180 
On its face, this provision seems to suggest that the “gender identity or 
gender expression” with which the employee’s dress and appearance is allowed 
 
176. See Case, supra note 3, at 28-30.  
177. Id. at 23 n.66 (discussing Sears’s preference for applicants who had “a low-pitched 
voice” but also cursed and participated in masculine sports). 
178. S. 815 § 8(a). 
179. For example, at such time as lower courts correctly apply what I have argued is the 
clear holding of Hopkins. 
180. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12949 (West 2014).  
 1368 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1333 
to be consistent need not fall into a conventional gender binary. But, in contrast 
to a simple ban on sex-specific appearance codes—which would apply to all 
employees equally regardless of identity—this provision seems to function 
more like the accommodation under Title VII for religious garb and groom-
ing,181 in that it is offered because of and not in spite of the employee’s identi-
ty, and, being conditioned on the establishment of an identity, raises the possi-
bility that as between two employees of the same firm in the same job, one does 
and the other doesn’t, for example, get to grow long hair or wear a skirt in con-
travention of the employer’s rules. If the gender identity being accommodated 
is indeed, as suggested by the text of the California statute, nonbinary, this 
makes it even more like religion and disability, subject to an almost infinite 
range of possibly required accommodations.182 
The current version of ENDA seems, however, decidedly binary in its ap-
proach to appearance, apparently premised on the traditional MTF-FTM model 
of transsexuality. Unfortunately, as I shall explain, as currently framed, it 
serves no constituency well,183 neither those who fit this model nor those who 
diverge from it. 
Consider first Jespersen herself. First, ENDA does her no favors by implic-
itly suggesting there could be some legal legitimacy to Harrah’s sex-
differentiated grooming codes. Second, assuming she were, as I have assumed 
above, willing to take on the full requirements of the grooming code for male 
bartenders at Harrah’s, it is unlikely she would qualify under ENDA to do so, 
because she gave no indication that her gender identity is in transition. She may 
be butch, but she showed no signs of identifying as male. Her ability to choose 
the most appropriate dress code should not have to depend on such a transition.  
Moreover, people far more distant from the masculine end of the appear-
ance spectrum than Jespersen might strongly prefer a choice of dress codes 
 
181. See Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, 
EEOC, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm (last vis-
ited June 8, 2014) (“In most instances, employers are required by federal law to make excep-
tions to their usual rules . . . to permit . . . employees to observe religious dress and grooming 
practices.”). As I have previously discussed, using the example of Colonel Martha McSally, 
who objected as both a woman and a Christian to being forced by the U.S. military to wear 
an abaya while stationed in Saudi Arabia, objections to sex-specific dress codes have of late 
received a more favorable hearing when grounded in claims of free exercise rather than in 
claims of sex equality. See Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and 
Constitutional Commitment, 19 AM. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 549, 574-76 (2011). 
182. And it is less like race and sex, as to which Title VII demands only nondiscrimina-
tion, not accommodation. 
183. Because they are not in transition, ENDA would not even help masculine men ob-
jecting to wearing the uniform in a pink-collar ghetto, such as the “first and only male nurse 
in a hospital were [he] required to wear exactly the same uniform as his female colleagues 
had been issued from time immemorial—white shirtdress, bonnet, pantyhose and pumps.” 
Case, supra note 83, at 1656 (quoting E-mail from Mary Anne Case to Richard A. Posner 
(Nov. 13, 2000)). 
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ENDA as currently written would deny them. I can speak very personally about 
this—no item in my professional wardrobe comes from the menswear depart-
ment, the current length of my hair is well below the collar, and, unlike Jesper-
sen, I have no categorical aversion to makeup, but if forced to choose between 
any set of male and female dress and grooming standards I have ever seen, 
from those enforced by Harrah’s to those endorsed by the EEOC Compliance 
Manual in 1981,184 I would unhesitatingly choose the male, even at the cost of 
acquiring a whole new wardrobe and a haircut. My choice would stem as much 
from reasons of practicality as taste—men’s clothing is, by and large, more 
comfortable and durable. Men’s shoes are easier on the feet and more condu-
cive to mobility than heels.185 As between, to use the EEOC Compliance Man-
ual’s example, having always to wear a necktie and always to wear a skirt, I 
have a strong preference for the former. Neckties present no risk of upskirting 
on Boston trains or freezing legs in Chicago winters. I would not, however, 
qualify for an exemption under ENDA from an otherwise enforceable sex-
specific dress code, because I am not “undergoing gender transition.”  
Instead, my gender expression is a more or less stable, potentially varying 
mix of masculine and feminine elements, something quite common in the popu-
lation at large, but particularly among the sexual minorities and gender noncon-
forming individuals ENDA was designed to protect.186 Many of these individu-
als frame it in identitarian terms, from genderqueer to any one of the more than 
fifty gender identity options now offered by Facebook187 or the even larger 
number previously offered by Yay Genderform!.188 
Representative Barney Frank, a principal sponsor of the direct predecessor 
to the current version of ENDA, infamously said of potential plaintiffs under 
ENDA that they “would have to have a ‘consistent gender presentation’ in or-
der to be able to sue for discrimination. ‘They can’t sit there with a full beard 
 
184. See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 619.1 (Oct. 1981). 
185. I was foolish enough to think one of the very few upsides of 9/11 might be the 
abandonment of high heels as business attire for women, given the blood-soaked pairs flee-
ing businesswomen left behind, as, unlike their male coworkers, they were forced to try to 
flee the collapsing World Trade Center barefoot. See, e.g., 9/11 Museum: A Survivor’s 
Blood-Soaked High Heels, TORONTO STAR (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.thestar.com/news/ 
world/2011/09/10/911_museum_a_survivors_bloodsoaked_high_heels.html. 
186. When speaking about ENDA, I often illustrate this point by holding up a Swatch 
with the question “What am I today?” written on its face, beneath the image of a Filipino 
transgender celebrity, half of whose face is made up and bejeweled, the word UNISEX run-
ning along a band displaying days of the week and male and female symbols. 
187. Martha Mendoza, Facebook Offers New Gender Options for Users, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 13, 2014, 6:35 PM EST), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
apnewsbreak-new-gender-options-facebook-users. 
188. YAY GENDERFORM!, http://www.yaygender.net/pages/gender.pl (last visited June 
8, 2014). 
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and a dress.’”189 There are two major problems with this statement of legisla-
tive intent. First, it incorrectly presumes that no one who combines a full beard 
and a dress can have a “consistent gender presentation.”190 Second, even Rep-
resentative Frank himself was known to mix and match, albeit less dramatical-
ly. In introducing ENDA in 2007, Representative Frank announced he had 
just left the hearing of the Financial Services Committee . . . . And . . . I didn’t 
want to . . . play favorites in my responsibilities. So that is why I appear before 
you today in a pinstripe suit and a lavender tie. I figured that would be kind of 
a sartorial compromise that could reach everything.191 
If, as some law firms did in the 1980s, Representative Frank’s employer had 
imposed color and not just style restrictions as part of its male dress code, he 
would be precluded from objecting under ENDA.  
Less hypothetically, consider one potential and one actual plaintiff who 
should clearly be among the intended beneficiaries of ENDA, but who would 
be out of luck under its current dress code provisions. Gay figure skater Johnny 
Weir, a commentator at the Sochi Olympics, received international attention for 
his flamboyant sartorial choices, which regularly combined items from male 
and female wardrobes. Fortunately, for Weir, the attention was overwhelmingly 
favorable.192  
Another television commentator, B. Scott, was less fortunate. Scott, a gay 
media personality who regularly dresses in a mixture of masculine and femi-
nine attire and grooms his long hair in a feminine style, had been hired by BET 
as a red carpet correspondent, but was pulled off air allegedly because his 
clothing choices for the evening were too feminine. He subsequently filed an 
antidiscrimination lawsuit193 under the California equivalent of ENDA, cited 
 
189. Steven T. Dennis & Tory Newmyer, Backers Say Gay Rights Bills Will Win in 
House: Moderates Are Uneasy, but Nondiscrimination Bill and DADT Repeal May Reach 
House Floor This Month, ROLL CALL (May 10, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/ 
issues/55_129/-46002-1.html (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative 
Frank). 
190. See, e.g., Sally McGrane, An Austrian Drag Queen Wins Eurovision, NEW YORKER 
(May 12, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/culture/2014/05/conchita-wurst-
wins-eurovision-2014.html (describing victory in a Europe-wide song competition of 
Conchita Wurst, a bearded man in an evening gown). 
191. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 (H.R. 2015): Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th 
Cong. 10-11 (2007) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank). 
192. See, e.g., Jordan Sargent, Ex-Skater Johnny Weir’s Fashion Is About to Take Over 
the Olympics, GAWKER (Feb. 9, 2014, 12:45 PM), http://gawker.com/ex-skater-johnny-
weirs-fashion-is-sochis-greatest-sub-1519357192 (describing Weir wearing “a white blazer 
over a white sheer v-neck shirt with a dramatic gold necklace pulled straight from your 
grandmother’s closet”). 
193. Complaint at 1, Sessoms v. BET Networks, Inc., No. BC517318 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://cdn.madamenoire.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/B-
SCOTT-BET-VIACOM-COMPLAINT-Blank.pdf. Scott’s lawsuit was subsequently dis-
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above, describing himself for the first time as transgender, to the consternation 
of many:  
[F]ans seemed . . . confused by the idea that a previously gay-identified femi-
nine person was now identifying as transgender yet wasn’t seeking to become 
a woman; and many trans women knew B.’s announcement would further 
muddy the waters for transsexual women who often combat widely popular 
images of drag queens, cross-dressers and other male-bodied folks who ex-
press femininity.194  
As Scott explained to supportive transgender activist Janet Mock, “[i]t was 
hard to pin down, label and classify myself. I had a lot to learn but when I final-
ly read that transgender also meant ‘neither or both,’ I was like, ‘Wow, that’s 
me!’ For the first time, I found something I was included in.”195 
As discussed above, Scott may have some prospect of winning under the 
California prohibition on gender identity discrimination which formed the basis 
for his lawsuit, but, as someone not in transition, he would have little chance of 
defending his dress and grooming choices under the proposed federal ENDA. 
It’s bad enough that the “Dress or Grooming Standards” provision current-
ly in ENDA lends some legislative credibility to clearly erroneous holdings like 
Jespersen and would leave Scott without a remedy. What’s worse is that it may 
serve those who are actually transitioning no better. Although the current ver-
sion of ENDA is touted as “trans-inclusive,” except for the mention of employ-
ees “undergoing gender transition” in the section on dress or grooming stand-
ards, no version of the word “trans” appears anywhere in it. If one were to ask 
what issues of importance to transgender employees are least apt to be success-
fully addressed by a continuing development of the law of sex discrimination 
under Title VII along the lines now so well begun, the most likely answer 
would be those pertaining to legally guaranteed access to sex-segregated spaces 
like bathrooms and to forms of address “for the gender to which the employ-
ee . . . is transitioning,” which are nowhere mentioned in ENDA.196 Following 
the Hopkins line works well when the objective is to dismantle sex distinctions, 
but it works less well when sex distinctions are likely to remain, as with bath-
 
missed on First Amendment grounds. Sunnivie Brydum, B. Scott to Appeal Ruling Finding 
BET Didn’t Discriminate, ADVOCATE.COM (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.advocate.com/ 
transgender/2014/04/18/b-scott-appeal-ruling-finding-bet-didnt-discriminate. 
194. Janet Mock, A Conversation with B. Scott on the Power of Defining Yourself, 
JANET MOCK (Aug. 9, 2013), http://janetmock.com/2013/08/09/b-scott-transgender-identity-
label.  
195. Id.; cf. Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in 
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211 (Harvey Molotch & Laura 
Norén eds., 2010) (arguing against segregation of restroom facilities).  
196. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 8(a) 
(2013) (as referred to the House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 2013). Indeed, the only men-
tion of bathrooms in ENDA is an oblique and negative one, which can hurt transitioning em-
ployees. See id. § 8(b) (stating that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to require the 
construction of new or additional facilities”). 
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rooms—although there is reason for transgender employees to be hopeful even 
with respect to bathroom access as sex discrimination law evolves.197 
The only statutory guarantee in ENDA that an employer must respect a 
transitioning employee’s access to aspects of the job lawfully sex segregated on 
the same terms as the employer makes them available to members of the sex to 
which the employee is transitioning pertains to dress and grooming standards, 
as to which Title VII case law is to date far clearer and more favorable to those 
transitioning than it is on, for example, bathrooms. There is a real risk that ap-
plication of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius will lead even a 
well-intentioned, scrupulous judge, and certainly one inclined to be hostile or 
skeptical of expanding employment rights on the basis of gender identity, to 
claim that since access to grooming standards is mentioned and access to bath-
rooms is not, ENDA must not have intended to expand bathroom access for 
those transitioning. This actually risks leaving transsexuals worse off than they 
are under the developing law of sex discrimination under Title VII. 
B. The Americans with Disabilites Act Experience as a Cautionary Tale 
for ENDA Proponents 
Advocates for the LGBT[QI . . .] community often have legitimate con-
cerns that a particular legal strategy will leave behind those parts of the com-
munity deemed farthest beyond the pale by the broader society. It should also 
cause concern when it’s the less extreme and those who, without repudiating 
the community, reject an identitarian label for themselves who get left be-
hind.198  
Let me tell this cautionary tale in two ways. The first is with reference to 
the dilemma of exit, voice, and loyalty. 199 If ENDA remains a central focus of 
energy before it passes, and then, after its passage, litigation energy were to 
move toward ENDA and away from Title VII, synergistic forward progress in 
the law could wither. More is at stake than merely employment discrimination, 
important though that is. Just as good law tended to migrate from Title VII sex 
discrimination cases to constitutional equal protection cases in the 1970s, so 
more recent Title VII law, good and bad, is migrating, not only to the constitu-
tional but to other statutory contexts, such as Title IX. That migration has pro-
 
197. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 169-12C-70, RESOLUTION AGREEMENT: BETWEEN 
ARCADIA SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 2 (2013), for evi-
dence that even access to bathrooms in a transitioning person’s destination sex can success-
fully be obtained under a simple prohibition on sex discrimination.  
198. I have previously argued that the LGBT community made both a strategic and a 
moral error in leaving behind straight marriage resisters in their quest for relationship recog-
nition. See generally Case, supra note 54, at 1228, 1232. 
199. See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 37 (1970). 
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duced constitutional protections for transgender government employees and in-
creased statutory protections for transgender students such as those covered by 
the Title IX settlement recently reached by the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Civil Rights Division and the Department of Education with the Arcadia Uni-
fied School District in California. This settlement, responding to a complaint 
filed by an FTM transgender student, required the school district to treat the 
student as male for all purposes and more generally to revise its policies to state 
that transgender and gender-nonconforming students are entitled to equal ac-
cess to all of the school’s programs, facilities, and activities.200 It could be the 
thin end of the wedge which would open up sex-segregated spaces to 
transgender individuals of all ages and stations in life. ENDA, however, covers 
only employment, and any good law generated under it would have more diffi-
culty migrating to fields such as education to protect individuals such as stu-
dents under federal law. 
An analysis of the experience of seeing the courts diverge from the hopes 
of the drafters of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also should serve 
as a warning to those invested in ENDA’s success. The ADA and ENDA have 
much in common, not the least of which is that Chai Feldblum, now an EEOC 
Commissioner, was a central player in the early drafting history of both stat-
utes. The story Feldblum tells, first in an op-ed she was instrumental in crafting 
for Representative Steny Hoyer,201 and then, after the op-ed had done its work 
in amending the law, in a law review article on the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008,202 is one I have long thought held lessons for ENDA. The ADA too, was 
a statute that became extremely complex, with even more complex regula-
tions,203 at the polar opposite of the addition of the single word “sex” into Title 
VII. It, too, had to resolve the issues raised by a wide variety of legislators and 
constituencies. The “business community . . . had concerns and reservations 
about the bill,”204 and the disability community, like the LGBT community, 
was quite diverse in its needs. As with ENDA, the ADA’s supporters wanted its 
coverage to be as broad as possible and did their best to choose statutory lan-
guage and provide legislative history they thought would give “clear instruc-
 
200. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 197, at 2. “Gender identity,” the settlement 
specified, means “one’s internal sense of gender . . . which is consistently and uniformly as-
serted, or for which there is other evidence that the gender identity is sincerely held as part of 
the student’s core identity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
201. Steny H. Hoyer, Op-Ed., Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O’Connor, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at B01. 
202. Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 
187 (2008). 
203. See id. at 192 (“Disability rights advocates were uncomfortable with the extreme 
degree of complexity introduced by the EEOC’s regulations into the disability coverage 
analysis. At bottom, however, most advocates believed that the EEOC regulations could not 
cause much harm in the long run for coverage of people with a range of physical and mental 
impairments . . . . How wrong we were.”). 
204. Id. at 190. 
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tions to the courts that the [statute] was intended to provide broad coverage 
prohibiting discrimination against people with a wide range” of conditions.205 
But, in a series of cases, the Supreme Court radically narrowed the scope of 
coverage under the ADA, restricting claims only to the more severely disabled, 
and not to those whose milder disabilities could be mitigated.206 
I have previously referred to this lesson as that of a Trans-Inclusive ENDA 
in a Rose-Colored Eyeglass Case, referring first to the rose-colored glasses with 
which ENDA supporters, like supporters of the ADA before them, approached 
the prospects for their statute in the courts and second, to the likelihood that 
ENDA, like the ADA before it, could find its scope limited by the courts, in a 
case analogous to Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. In Sutton, the Supreme Court 
held that wearers of eyeglasses, because they were insufficiently disabled and 
too numerous, were not intended to be covered by the ADA.207 The disability 
community was eventually able to convince Congress to amend the law to 
overcome these limitations, but it took them years; and initially their prospects 
looked so dim, they “agreed that any effort to change the law at that time might 
result in adverse consequences for the law.”208 
If the courts were to impose similar limitations in their interpretation of 
ENDA, there is a far lower probability that the LGBT community could effect 
the sort of statutory amendment that the disability community eventually man-
aged for a number of reasons, including that the foreseeable opponents of such 
an amendment include the religious right and that Congress generally has be-
come less functional in the years since 2008.  
C. In Addition to Its Many Dangerous Ambiguities, the Current Version 
of ENDA Has Many Severe Limitations 
Even most advocates of ENDA acknowledge, at least privately, that it has 
many problems. Let me, in the Subparts following, briefly touch on three of 
them, in addition to those already discussed above, in furtherance of my argu-
ment that whatever the limitations of Title VII, it is a better vehicle for combat-
ing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity than 
the current version of ENDA. The first, ENDA’s already very broad and broad-
ening religious exemption is generally acknowledged to be a serious limitation, 
but only those who follow both the recent changes in the text of ENDA and the 
even more recent (and still ongoing) rapid legal change in the field of religious 
accommodation will have yet realized exactly how serious it is likely to be-
come. The second, the absence of a BFOQ, may be seen by some as a feature 
and not a bug, but I want to raise some doubts about this conclusion. The third, 
 
205. Id. at 188. 
206. See id. at 193. 
207. 527 U.S. 471, 482, 484 (1999). 
208. Feldblum et al., supra note 202, at 193. 
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the absence of a disparate impact claim, may promote evasion and prevent 
workplace improvements that could benefit employers and employees alike. 
1. The current version of ENDA has a religious exemption that 
started out broad and is getting broader 
Unlike any other federally forbidden ground for discrimination in employ-
ment except religion itself, ENDA has a built-in exemption for religious organ-
izations, which provides that it “shall not apply to a corporation, association, 
educational institution or institution of learning, or society that is exempt from 
the religious discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . . . (referred to in this section as a ‘religious employer’).”209 
 The direct effect of this in itself would greatly diminish the number of em-
ployees who could benefit from the protections of ENDA, given that many 
LGBT individuals are employed by religious organizations. But the indirect 
signaling effects could be far worse, enshrining in law and in the understanding 
of legislators and citizens the notion that discrimination on the grounds of sex-
ual orientation or gender identity (SOGI) is somehow more to be tolerated and 
accommodated than discrimination on other forbidden grounds. This is likely to 
strengthen the already vociferous demands of religious objectors around the 
country for legislative exemptions or accommodation for SOGI discrimination 
in other state and federal laws, such as those in laws that a multitude of states in 
the very recent past considered enacting.210 
Were this religious exemption not already enough to give ENDA support-
ers pause, a last-minute expansion, introduced after ENDA had already passed 
the Senate and was being referred to the House, radically expanded it by 
providing that: 
A religious employer’s exemption under this section shall not result in any ac-
tion by a Federal agency, or any State or local agency that receives Federal 
funding or financial assistance, to penalize or withhold licenses, permits, certi-
fications, accreditation, contracts, grants, guarantees, tax-exempt status, or any 
benefits or exemptions from that employer, or to prohibit the employer’s par-
ticipation in programs or activities sponsored by that Federal, State, or local 
agency. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to invalidate any other 
Federal, State, or local law (including a regulation) that otherwise applies to a 
religious employer exempt under this section.211 
 
209. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013) 
(as referred to the House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 2013). 
210. For an overview of these efforts, see generally Dana Liebelson, Inside the Con-
servative Campaign to Launch “Jim Crow-Style” Bills Against Gay Americans, MOTHER 
JONES (Feb. 20, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/gay-
discrimination-bills-religious-freedom-jim-crow. 
211. S. 815 § 6(b). 
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While the language of this provision is difficult to parse, its intent is clear: 
it aims to shield discriminating religious employers, at least to some extent, 
from the possible cost in government benefits and funding potentially with-
drawn from them by units of government unwilling to subsidize SOGI discrim-
ination or grant privileges to those who engage in it. 
Were this still not enough to give the supporters of ENDA pause, there is 
the possibility of much worse to come. This Essay goes to press at a time when 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is sub judice. Hobby Lobby is representa-
tive of a host of cases in which for-profit corporations and their owners are rais-
ing religious objections to complying with some aspect of the contraception 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act.212 Among the claims raised by a number 
of these corporations and individuals is that the government cannot show that 
the mandate is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest, as 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) demands,213 because the gov-
ernment has already exempted nonprofit religious corporations (among others) 
from the mandate, leaving it more difficult to argue that for-profit religious 
employers cannot be exempt.214 Were the Supreme Court to hold that for-profit 
corporations or their owners have a cognizable claim under RFRA—and further 
to hold that the religious exemptions and accommodations that the Obama Ad-
ministration already allows to the contraceptive mandate either undercut the 
compelling governmental interest or reveal the presence and practicality of less 
restrictive means to further that interest—the results have the potential to be 
catastrophic for ENDA. First, another somewhat open question would have to 
be resolved: is the federal RFRA applicable to lawsuits between private par-
ties? Some courts have held that it is, at least when a statute “is enforceable by 
the EEOC as well as private plaintiffs,” as ENDA would be.215 The cata-
strophic scenario would then be this: for-profit employers who claim a religious 
opposition to LGBT rights could then use RFRA to demand that a religious ex-
emption be extended to them. Not only would the existence of the statutory re-
ligious exemption undercut the government’s claim of a compelling interest in 
applying ENDA to the objecting for-profit employers, but also those objecting 
employers might prevail on the claim that, in general, prevention of SOGI dis-
 
212. See 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (granting petition for a writ of certiorari on the question 
of whether a for-profit corporation may deny its employees the health coverage of contracep-
tives to which the employees are otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the religious 
objections of the corporation’s owners). 
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
214. For an overview of this claim from a position sympathetic to the religious claim-
ants, see John Bursch, Symposium: Hobby Lobby and Conestoga; The Most Difficult-to-
Answer Question, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2014/02/symposium-hobby-lobby-and-conestoga-the-most-difficult-to-answer-question. 
215. See Hankins v. Lyghte, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding, over a dissent by 
then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor, that RFRA was applicable in a suit between private parties 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).  
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crimination is not a compelling governmental interest in the same way that pre-
vention of race and sex discrimination have been held to be. The result could be 
to exempt from ENDA virtually any employer who could claim a religious ob-
jection to complying with it.216 
Those who are, however reluctantly, prepared to tolerate a religious ex-
emption may hope that in time it can be repealed or that the religious organiza-
tions (and other employers) who wish to avail themselves of it will dwindle. 
But there is little precedent for the repeal of religious exemptions once they are 
enshrined in law,217 and there is more reason to suspect that once enacted  
they risk becoming entrenched, not only in the law, but also in the minds of  
believers. 
2. The current version of ENDA has no BFOQ exception and 
prohibits “preferential treatment or quotas” 
With the exception of race and color, all of the forbidden grounds for em-
ployment discrimination under Title VII have BFOQ provisions.218 Even in the 
absence of a BFOQ for race, federal judges like my colleague Judge Richard 
Posner have allowed race to be used as a factor in employment, for example, in 
hiring a correctional officer in a prison boot camp where more than two-thirds 
of the inmates are black.219 This makes the absence of a BFOQ in ENDA par-
ticularly remarkable. Consider a comparison with the use of the BFOQ for sex. 
The EEOC regulations allow for the possibility of sex being a BFOQ “[w]here 
it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness . . . e.g., [as] an 
actor or actress.”220 I have previously noted how bizarre this regulation is, giv-
en that “the very essence of [an actor’s] job is to pretend to be something one is 
not.”221 But there certainly are advocates for lesbian, gay, and particularly of 
late transgender actors who would maintain that, for the “purpose of authentici-
ty or genuineness,” such actors should have priority for certain roles,222 and 
 
216. I am grateful to Chip Lupu for confirming my intuition on this score, albeit sorry 
to see it confirmed. 
217. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State 
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 493 (2010) (documenting that states rarely later narrow the 
scope of their state RFRAs, and do not repeal the statutes across the board, but only amend 
them to deal with particularized needs). It is even conceivable that those from whom an ex-
emption is withdrawn could raise a constitutional objection. See id. at 494-95. 
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), (e).  
219. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that preferring a lower-
scoring black applicant for the position was constitutionally permissible). 
220. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2013). 
221. Case, supra note 3, at 12 n.23. 
222. For example, transgender activist Laverne Cox has said, “What a difference it 
makes when an actual trans person plays the role.” Erik Piepenburg, When They Play Wom-
en, It’s Not Just an Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
07/31/movies/new-roles-for-transgender-performers.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that a production which considers an actor’s identity in making a casting deci-
sion should not be at risk of a lawsuit under ENDA. There are a multiplicity of 
other potential LGBT-focused employers, from the North American Gay Ama-
teur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA)223 to certain advocacy, support, or counsel-
ing centers for the LGBT community, who might also wish to consider sexual 
orientation or gender identity in hiring decisions and for whom the absence of a 
BFOQ exception, especially combined with ENDA’s prohibition on “preferen-
tial treatment or quotas”224 could pose problems. 
Another set of circumstances in which a BFOQ for sex has been upheld is 
for jobs requiring viewing or touching of another person’s naked body.225 
There are some men who would have as strong or stronger objections to having 
their naked body viewed on a screen or their body cavities searched by a gay 
man than by a woman, and some women who might prefer a gay man, even if 
not a straight man, to a lesbian as their nurse’s aide. While I take no normative 
position on the availability of a BFOQ exception in the interests of sexual pri-
vacy,226 I do note that to allow a BFOQ for sex in such circumstances and cat-
egorically to foreclose one for orientation seems puzzlingly inconsistent.227 
And the fact that both proponents and opponents of LGBT rights might each, in 
some circumstances, favor the availability of a BFOQ makes its complete ab-
sence in ENDA also puzzling. 
 
223. See, e.g., Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, No. C10-0682-JCC, 
2011 WL 5563206, at *1, *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2011) (holding that, as an expressive 
association, the NAGAAA could limit participation to “openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
individuals,” notwithstanding the prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination in Wash-
ington’s Law Against Discrimination (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
224. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(f) (2013) 
(as referred to the House of Representatives, Nov. 12, 2013) (capitalization altered). 
225. See, e.g., Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 740 (6th Cir. 2004) (up-
holding a women’s prison’s decision not to hire male guards in the interest of protecting the 
prisoners’ privacy and preventing sexual assaults); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 
F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978) (upholding a retirement home’s refusal to hire a male 
nurse’s aide when the majority of its residents were female), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 
1979).  
226. Indeed, precisely the complications raised by concerns around sexual orientation 
have caused some to question the BFOQ for sex when applied to positions such as prison 
guard. As my colleague Judge Frank Easterbrook observed in rejecting a male prisoner’s 
Eighth Amendment claim against being guarded by a female who might see him naked in the 
shower, “There are too many permutations to place guards and prisoners into multiple clas-
ses by sex, sexual orientation, and perhaps other criteria, allowing each group to be observed 
only by the corresponding groups that occasion the least unhappiness.” Johnson v. Phelan, 
69 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1995). 
227. Advocates for ENDA may have thought a BFOQ exception would do more harm 
than good, given the frequency with which the objection to potentially being exposed to a 
gay male gaze has in the past been used to justify the exclusion of gay men from, for exam-
ple, the military. Precisely this frequently voiced objection, however, makes it all the more 
surprising that those lobbying against ENDA or not yet committed to supporting it have not 
insisted on a BFOQ.  
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3. The current version of ENDA does not allow for disparate impact 
claims 
According to Representative Frank, who introduced the predecessor to the 
current version of ENDA in Congress in 2007, the same reason explains the ex-
clusion of both the possibility of affirmative action and the possibility of bring-
ing disparate impact claims under ENDA: a respect for the right of privacy of 
employees and job applicants and an unwillingness to force them to disclose 
their sexual orientation.228 But, as I discussed at length in Disaggregating Gen-
der, the ability to bring disparate impact claims on the grounds of sex has 
enormous upsides, not only for employees, but also for employers, their cus-
tomers, and society generally.229 Of course, the most important upside for the 
protected group is the ability that disparate impact claims offer to combat de-
liberate attempts at evasion of the statute’s provisions through establishment of 
job requirements designed not to improve job performance, but precisely to ex-
clude members of the protected group. Thus, just as employers instituted new 
educational requirements in an effort to exclude blacks and new height and 
weight requirements in an effort to exclude women at the very instant Title VII 
went into effect,230 so too employers who would otherwise have openly dis-
criminated on the basis of sexual orientation might well seek to find proxies 
such as marital status or to revive morals clauses in employment contracts. 
Disparate impact claims can also serve as a remedy for the unconscious bias 
sometimes present in an employer’s subjective evaluation of employees or of 
job requirements. 
CONCLUSION: SOUR GRAPES AND SWEETER, LOWER-HANGING FRUIT 
Compared to the inclusion of the prohibition on sex discrimination in the 
text of Title VII, the effort at the federal level to pass a statute clearly banning 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity has been extraordinarily long, difficult, and tortuous. From the moment 
in 1975 when Representative Bella Abzug first introduced a bill proposing that 
Title VII be “amended by adding after the word ‘sex’ each time it appears the 
words ‘affectional or sexual preference,’” defined as “having or manifesting an 
emotional or physical attachment to another consenting person or persons of 
either gender, or having or manifesting a preference for such attachment”;231 
 
228. See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 (H.R. 2015): Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 
supra note 191, at 11-13 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank). 
229. See Case, supra note 3, at 91. 
230. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that tests and 
measuring procedures for employment must reasonably measure job performance and must 
not operate to discriminate on the basis of race, even without discriminatory intent). 
231. H.R. 166, 94th Cong. §§ 6, 11 (1975). 
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through the single day in 1996 when the Senate held up-or-down votes on both 
the Defense of Marriage Act, which passed, and ENDA, which failed by one 
vote;232 to 2007 when the first trans-inclusive version of ENDA was introduced 
and then withdrawn;233 to the present, when a version of ENDA has passed the 
Senate but will almost certainly not be presented to the House before the end of 
this congressional term, ENDA has become increasingly complicated both tex-
tually and conceptually, but has not come appreciably closer to being enacted 
into law. 
Given the current state of ENDA, with its massive limitations and ambigui-
ties, ENDA should perhaps be seen by LGBT rights advocates as genuinely 
sour grapes, not only hard to reach, but neither tasty nor nourishing if finally 
grasped. In the meantime, the EEOC, LGBT public interest lawyers, individual 
employees, and employees’ private counsel can continue gradually to pluck the 
lower-hanging, sweeter fruit of sex discrimination under Title VII, as fruit on 
the higher branches of Title VII law gradually ripens, causing the boughs to 
bend and bring it within reach, so that in the not-too-distant future the harvest 
may be complete, and the individuals ENDA was designed to protect may be 




232. Suzanne B. Goldberg et al., The Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Its Scope, 
History, and Prospects, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (Christine Michelle Duffy ed., forthcoming 2015). 
233. Id. 
234. There is precedent for such a result in the history of the Equal Rights Amendment. 
Although even the efforts of Howard Smith and the National Women’s Party were not 
enough to pass a constitutional amendment, the results promised by the Equal Rights 
Amendment were achieved by the litigation strategy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and a receptive 
Supreme Court. See Case, supra note 23, at 1450. 
